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I. INTRODUCTION 
International legal theory and international relations theory have long focused on 
the state as the principal unit of analysis.1  From this traditional interstate 
perspective, the state is a unitary actor that “faces the outside world as an integrated 
unit” and speaks with one voice in its interactions with other unitary states.2  
According to this view, “the paradigmatic form of international cooperation is the 
multilateral international convention, negotiated over many years in various 
international watering holes, signed and ratified with attendant flourish and 
formality, and given continuing life through the efforts of an international 
secretariat.” 3  The implication of the traditional interstate approach is that the key 
to understanding international legal and regulatory cooperation is to understand 
interactions among unitary states within frameworks agreed upon in formal treaties. 
Notwithstanding the importance of interstate cooperation in world politics, this 
traditional approach obscures an increasingly important form of cooperation: 
1 Regarding international law, see e.g., J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 1 (6th ed. 
1963) (defining international law as “the body of rules and principles of action which are 
binding upon civilized states in their relations with one another”) and IAN BROWNLIE, 
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 59 (5th ed.1998) (identifying states as most 
important category of legal persons under international law).  Regarding international 
relations theory, see e.g., PAUL R. VIOTTI & MARK V. KAUPPI, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
THEORY: REALISM, PLURALISM, GLOBALISM, AND BEYOND 6 (3d ed. 1999) (noting that 
according to realist international relations theory, states are the most important actors) and 
KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 79 and 94-95 (1979) (arguing that 
states are the defining units of the international system).  In international law, a state is 
defined as possessing the following characteristics: (a) a permanent population, (b) a defined 
territory, (c) government, and (d) capacity to enter into foreign relations with other states.  
BROWNLIE, at 70.  This definition generally does not include states in federal unions (such as 
state of the United States), provinces, or other sub-state units.  THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & 
HAROLD G. MAIER, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (2d ed. 1990). 
2 VIOTTI & KAUPPI, supra note 1 at 6. 
3 ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 12-13 (2004) [hereinafter 
SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER] 
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transgovernmental cooperation.  This form of cooperation is characterized by 
transgovernmental networks, which are “pattern[s] of regular and purposive 
relations among like government units working across the borders that divide 
countries from one another and that demarcate the ‘domestic’ from the 
‘international’ sphere.”4  Political scientist and legal scholar Anne-Marie Slaughter 
argues in a new book that this form of cooperation is becoming so widespread and 
important that it constitutes a “new world order.”5
To understand this new order, Slaughter calls on scholars to change the way they 
look at the world substantially: 
[T]o see these networks as they exist, much less to imagine what they could 
become, requires a deep conceptual shift.  Stop imagining the international 
system as a system of states—unitary entities like billiard balls or black 
boxes—subject to rules created by international institutions that are apart 
from, “above” these states.  Start thinking about a world of governments, 
with all the different institutions that perform the basic functions of 
governments—legislation, adjudication, implementation—interacting both 
with each other domestically and also with their foreign and supranational 
counterparts.6
This conceptual shift promises new insights on international legal and regulatory 
cooperation.  Indeed, the existing scholarship on transgovernmental cooperation, 
which includes Slaughter’s book as well as her earlier articles,7 the seminal work of 
political scientists Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye,8 and recent work by legal 
scholar and political scientist Kal Raustiala,9 has already documented the rise of 
transgovernmental legal and regulatory networks, addressed important normative 
4 Id. at 14. 
5 Id. at 15-18.  See also Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN 
AFF. 184 (Sept./Oct. 1997) [hereinafter Real Order]. 
6 SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 3, at 5. 
7 SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 3; Slaughter, Real Order, supra note 5; 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Agencies on the Loose? Holding Government Networks Accountable, 
in TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION: LEGAL PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL 
PROSPECTS 521 (George A. Bermann, Matthias Herdegen & Peter L. Lindseth, eds., 2000) 
[hereinafter Slaughter, Agencies on the Loose]; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global 
Economy through Government Networks, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: 
ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Michael Byers ed., 2000) 
[hereinafter Slaughter, Global Economy]; and Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Accountability of 
Government Networks, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 347 (2001) [hereinafter Slaughter, 
Accountability]. 
8 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. & Robert O. Keohane, Transnational Relations and World Politics: 
An Introduction, 25 INT’L. ORG. 329 (1971) and Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, 
Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations, 27 WORLD POL. 39 (1974) 
[hereinafter Keohane & Nye, Transgovernmental Relations]. 
9 Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental 
Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2002). 
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and empirical implications, and identified factors that help explain the rise of 
transgovernmentalism in general.10
But why is legal and regulatory cooperation among some states and in some 
issue areas principally interstate, while among other states and in other issue areas 
it is primarily transgovernmental?  In other words, what determines whether 
cooperation is likely to be interstate or transgovernmental?  More generally, what 
explains variations in levels of transgovernmentalism across different groups of 
states and across different issue areas?  So far legal scholars and political scientists 
have devoted relatively little attention to these questions, leaving a significant gap 
in the literature on transgovernmental cooperation.11
The principal goal of this article is to contribute to the scholarship on 
transgovernmental legal and regulatory networks and transgovernmentalism in 
general by taking a modest step toward filling that gap.  To accomplish this, this 
article uses two analytical tools from the discipline of political science: the concept 
of transgovernmental relations12 and the theory of rational institutional design.13  It 
applies these tools to develop a rational design theory of transgovernmentalism 
aimed at explaining the conditions under which legal and regulatory cooperation is 
more likely to be transgovernmental versus interstate.14
Because transgovernmentalism has potentially profound implications not only 
for cooperation across borders but also for governance within borders, the 
questions raised by this article have not only international but also domestic 
importance.  By definition, transgovernmental networks involve domestic legal and 
regulatory agencies that are part of domestic governmental structures.  On the one 
hand, transgovernmental cooperation can enhance the ability of these agencies to 
efficiently and effectively pursue their domestic mandates.  On the other hand, 
there is considerable concern that domestic agencies participating in 
transgovernmental networks lack democratic accountability, leading some to fear 
the advent of “agencies on the loose.”15  Among the concerns are lack of 
transparency and the distortion of domestic political processes.16  Thus, 
understanding transgovernmental networks is important not only for scholars of 
10 See infra Part II.C. 
11 See infra Part II.C. 
12 See infra Part II.B. 
13 See infra Part III.A.  A secondary goal of this article is to contribute to rational 
institutional design scholarship.  The existing scholarship focuses primarily on formal 
international organizations and has not yet been explicitly applied to transgovernmental 
networks.  This article’s rational design theory of transgovernmentalism attempts to do 
exactly that, using the logic of rational design to help understand the emergence of 
transgovernmental legal and regulatory networks. 
14 See infra Part III. 
15 This phrase is from the title of a book chapter by Anne-Marie Slaughter, in which she 
discusses and responds to these concerns.  Slaughter, Agencies on the Loose, supra note 7. 
16 See SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 3, at 219-224 (acknowledging these 
concerns) and 230-244 (proposing solutions to these problems). 
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international law and politics, but also domestic law and politics. 
The article proceeds in four main parts.  Part II will compare the traditional 
concept of interstate relations with the concept of transgovernmental relations. Part 
II will then review the existing scholarship on transgovernmental relations, relating 
it to the article’s central research question: What accounts for varying levels of 
transgovernmentalism across different groups of states and across different issue 
areas? Part III will develop a rational design theory of transgovernmentalism that 
responds to this question.  The first section of Part III will apply the theory of 
rational institutional design to the concept of transgovernmentalism, framing 
interstate versus transgovernmental cooperation as a design choice by heads of state 
or regulators.  The second section of Part III will state several preconditions for 
transgovernmental cooperation that are assumed by the rational design theory of 
transgovernmentalism.  The third section of Part III will identify the theory’s 
dependent and explanatory variables. The final section of Part III will use the 
rational design theory of transgovernmentalism to derive a series of conjectures 
about how the level of transgovernmentalism (the dependent variable) is likely to 
be affected by distribution problems; preference heterogeneity; enforcement 
problems; high politics; issue complexity; agency autonomy; and antecedent 
interactions in interstate organizations (the explanatory variables). Part IV will 
apply the conjectures from Part III to the case of European Union (E.U.)-United 
States (U.S.) merger review cooperation as an initial plausibility test of the rational 
design theory of transgovernmentalism.  The theory and case study suggest that 
issue complexity, preference heterogeneity among states, and enforcement 
problems are among the factors that may significantly influence levels of 
transgovernmentalism. 
II. TWO FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AND REGULATORY COOPERATION 
This article considers two forms of international legal and regulatory 
cooperation.  First, international legal and regulatory cooperation may consist of 
interstate cooperation between two states.  For example, the states may negotiate, 
sign and ratify a treaty requiring them to cause certain legal or regulatory steps to 
be taken inside their respective borders.  Alternatively, international legal and 
regulatory cooperation may entail transgovernmental cooperation, involving direct 
cross-border interaction between the states’ government lawyers and regulators.  
This part of the article explains these two forms of international legal and 
regulatory cooperation in more detail, briefly surveys the existing scholarly 
literature on transgovernmentalism, and relates this literature to the article’s central 
research question: What accounts for varying levels of transgovernmentalism 
across different groups of states and across different issue areas? 
A. Interstate Cooperation 
As Nye and Keohane explain, “Students and practitioners of international 
politics have traditionally concentrated their attention on relationships between 
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states.  The state, regarded as an actor with purposes and power, is the basic unit of 
action . . . . Most political scientists and many diplomats seem to accept this view 
of reality, and a state-centric view of world affairs prevails.”17  This interstate 
vision of international cooperation relies on two central assumptions: (1) that states 
are the most important actors in world politics, and therefore the key unit of 
analysis for scholars of international cooperation; and (2) that states are unitary 
actors.18  Various forms of these simplifying assumptions are shared by many of 
the most influential theories of world politics, including realism,19 regime theory,20 
constructivism,21 and, to a limited extent, liberal international relations theory.22  
Moreover, these assumptions are implicit in traditional definitions of international 
law.23
A critical implication of the first assumption, that the state is the principal unit of 
analysis, is that heads of state are the principal negotiators of cooperation in world 
politics.  As Slaughter characterizes this assumption, “it is the head of state who is 
the embodiment and representative of the State in the international system, the 
gatekeeper for all interactions, both domestic and international.”24 In the words of 
Mark Pollack and Gregory Shaffer, the assumption is that heads of state “enjoy a 
monopoly on the external representation of their respective states.”25  This suggests 
that significant international legal and regulatory cooperation is likely to occur only 
if heads of state agree to it. 
The second assumption, that states are unitary actors, implies that international 
cooperation is cooperation between states qua states.  In negotiations, each state is 
presumed to speak with a single voice, represented by either its head of state or 
foreign minister.  To the extent there are policy disagreements between different 
17 Nye & Keohane, supra note 8, at 329. 
18 VIOTTI & KAUPPI, supra note 1, at 6. 
19 Id. at 6.  For an important statement of classical realism, see HANS J. MORGENTHAU, 
POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE (5th ed. revised, 1978), 
and for a leading statement of neorealism (sometimes called “structural realism”), see 
WALTZ, supra note 1. 
20 See, e.g., ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE 
WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 25 (1984) (“our analysis of international cooperation and 
regimes therefore focuses principally on states”) [hereinafter KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY]. 
21 See, e.g., ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 43 and 
197 (1999) (defending the unitary actor assumption). 
22 Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer, Transatlantic Governance in Historical and 
Theoretical Perspective, in  TRANSATLANTIC GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 24 
(Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer, eds., 2001) (noting that in the two-level games 
model, heads of state enjoy a monopoly on the external representation of their respective 
states). 
23 See, e.g., BRIERLY, supra note 1. 
24 Slaughter, Global Economy, supra note 7, at 177 
25 Pollack & Shaffer, supra note 22, at 24. This is not an assumption that these authors 
are necessarily committed to. 
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institutions within a state, such as disagreements with or between relevant legal or 
regulatory agencies, the assumption is that these differences are worked out 
domestically.  As Slaughter notes, “the analytical lens of the unitary state obscures 
the very existence of these different government institutions.”26  Moreover, if an 
agreement is reached, the resulting cooperation is deemed to consist of actions 
taken by states as such.  For example, if a state joins a treaty for reducing emissions 
of a pollutant, the only relevant question is whether the state’s emissions conform 
to agreed-upon levels.  The state’s efforts to comply with the treaty may involve 
activities of a governmental subunit, such as an environmental agency; but the 
interstate image implies that the scope of such activity is principally domestic and 
does not significantly extend beyond the state’s borders.27
B. Transgovernmental Cooperation 
An alternative to the interstate approach began to emerge in the 1970s in the 
work of political scientists Keohane and Nye, who developed a concept of 
transgovernmental relations.28  Keohane and Nye define transgovernmental 
relations as “sets of direct interactions among sub-units of different governments 
that are not controlled or closely guided by the policies of the cabinets or chief 
executives of those governments.”29  Based on their definition, the 
transgovernmental approach differs from the interstate approach in two 
fundamental ways.  First, the transgovernmental approach focuses on interactions 
26 SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 3, at 13. 
27 This is consistent with the current state of public international law: “individual 
government institutions cannot be subjected to specific obligations or duties under 
international law.  Nor can they exercise specific rights.  Sovereignty is possessed by the 
state as a whole, not by its component parts.” SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 
3, at 34. 
28 Nye & Keohane, Transnational Relations, supra note 8.  Keohane and Nye note, 
however, that other scholars, such as Raymond Aron, Philip Jessup, Karl Kaiser, Horst 
Menderhausen, and James Rosenau used non-”state centric” concepts like “transnational 
relations” before they did.  Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Preface, 25 INT’L ORG. 
v (1971).  Keohane and Nye explain that their interest in the concept of transnational 
relations was originally a response to what they viewed as an overemphasis on the study of 
formal international organizations.  Id.  Later, they refined their concept to distinguish 
between transnational relations, which they restricted to nongovernmental actors, and 
transgovernmental relations, which refers to interactions among sub-units of governments.  
Keohane & Nye, Transgovernmental Relations, supra note 8. 
29 Id. at 43.  Keohane and Nye also distinguished between two major types of 
transgovernmental relations: policy coordination and coalition building.  
“Transgovernmental policy coordination refers to activity designed to facilitate smooth 
implementation or adjustment of policy, in the absence of detailed higher policy directives.”  
At its most basic, this simply involves “informal communication among working-level 
officials of different bureaucracies.”  In contrast, “transgovernmental coalition building takes 
place when sub-units build coalitions with like-minded agencies from other governments 
against elements of their own administrative structures.” Id. at 44. 
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among government subunits, whereas the interstate approach emphasizes 
interactions among states.30  Second, the transgovernmental approach assumes that 
government subunits can act autonomously from states,31 whereas the interstate 
approach treats states as unitary actors.32
Recently, Slaughter began building on earlier work on transgovernmental 
relations, introducing her own concept of “transgovernmental networks” in an 
influential 1997 article in Foreign Affairs.33  Reacting to an argument made in an 
earlier issue of Foreign Affairs34 that power in world politics is shifting from states 
to non-state actors,35 Slaughter argued that “[t]he state is not disappearing, it is 
disaggregating into its separate functionally distinct parts.  These parts—courts, 
regulatory agencies, executives, and even legislatures—are networking with their 
counterparts abroad, creating a dense web of relations that constitutes a new, 
transgovernmental order.”36  Emphasizing the growing importance of these 
networks, Slaughter contends that the most important actors in world politics are no 
longer foreign ministries and heads of state, but rather the same types of 
government institutions that are important in domestic politics, such as 
administrative agencies, courts, and legislatures.37
Slaughter defines transgovernmental networks as “pattern[s] of regular and 
purposive relations among like government units working across the borders that 
divide countries from one another and that demarcate the ‘domestic’ from the 
‘international’ sphere.”38  She then distinguishes among three different types of 
transgovernmental networks.39  First, there are government networks within 
international organizations.40 Second, there are government networks within the 
framework of agreements negotiated by heads of state,41 a network type that 
30 See supra Part II.A. 
31 As Keohane and Nye note, subunit autonomy is a “matter of degree.” Keohane & Nye, 
Transgovernmental Relations, supra note 8, at 44. 
32 See supra Part II.A. 
33 Slaughter, Real Order, supra note 5. 
34 Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, FOREIGN AFF. 50 (Jan./Feb. 1997). 
35 Slaughter, Real Order, supra note 5, at 183 (discussing Matthews, supra note 34). 
36 Slaughter, Real Order, supra note 5, at 184. 
37 Slaughter, Global Economy, supra note 7, at 178. 
38 SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 3, at 14. 
39 SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 3, at 45-49.  See also Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies, and Disaggregated 
Democracy, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1041, 1053-1058 (2003). 
40 SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 3, at 45-46.  Examples of this type 
include networks among trade ministers in the framework of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, finance ministers in the International Monetary Fund, defense and foreign 
ministers in NATO, central bankers in the Bank for International Settlements, and economic 
and regulatory officials in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Id. 
at 46. 
41 Id. at 46-48.  Examples of this type include interactions between American and 
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Slaughter says “is more striking as a form of governance, in that it emerges outside 
formal international institutions.  Nevertheless, the members of these networks 
operate within a framework agreed on at least by the heads of their respective 
governments.”42  Finally, there are “spontaneous” transgovernmental networks.43  
Spontaneous transgovernmental networks arise without interstate agreement and 
may either formalize themselves as transgovernmental regulatory organizations or 
result from agreements among domestic regulatory agencies of two or more 
states.44  As Slaughter notes, “[t]he last few decades have witnessed the emergence 
of a vast network of such agreements effectively institutionalizing channels of 
regulatory cooperation between specific countries.  These agreements embrace 
principles that can be implemented by the regulators themselves; they do not need 
further approval by national legislators.”45
C. An Assessment of Transgovernmental Relations Scholarship 
The point of the foregoing discussion is not that interstate legal and regulatory 
cooperation is not important (it is) nor that all significant legal and regulatory 
cooperation is transgovernmental (it is not).46  Rather, the point is that there are at 
least two basic ways that international legal and regulatory cooperation can be 
structured—interstate and transgovernmental—and that exclusive reliance on the 
traditional approach that is conceptually based on the former carries with it the risk 
of neglecting the latter.47
The existing literature on transgovernmentalism has already gone a long way 
toward helping scholars avoid this risk of overlooking transgovernmental forms of 
international legal and regulatory cooperation.  As noted above, this literature has 
European regulators in called for by heads of state in the Transatlantic Declaration of 1990, 
the New Transatlantic Agenda of 1995, and the Transatlantic Economic Partnership 
agreement of 1998. Id. at 47. 
42 Id. at 46-47. 
43 Id. at 48-49. 
44 Id. Examples of this type include the Basel Committee, the International Organization 
of Securities Commissioners, and the International Network for Environmental Compliance 
and Enforcement. Id. at 48. 
45 Id. at 49. 
46 SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 3, at 39; Raustiala, supra note 9, at 50. 
47 There is, in fact, a third category of interactions that represent another form of 
cooperation: transnational relations, defined as “regular interactions across national 
boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a 
national government or an intergovernmental organization.”  Thomas Risse-Kappen, 
Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Introduction, in BRINGING TRANSNATIONAL 
RELATIONS BACK IN: NON-STATE ACTORS, DOMESTIC STRUCTURES AND INTERNATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS 3 (Thomas Risse-Kappen ed., 1995).  Among the nongovernmental actors that 
are widely studied by scholars of transnational relations are nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs).  See, e.g., MARGARET E. KECK AND KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND 
BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998). 
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provided a valuable concept for recognizing and analyzing transgovernmental 
networks to complement the traditional concept of interstate cooperation.48  
Moreover, the literature presents the advantages of transgovernmental networks 
compared to interstate forms of cooperation.  A fundamental advantage is that 
transgovernmental networks may be able to solve global problems in a manner that 
does not involve concentrating power in international organizations, power which 
then might be abused.49  Moreover, “[networks] are fast, flexible, cheap, and 
potentially more effective, accountable, and inclusive than existing international 
institutions.”50  Raustiala adds that transgovernmental networks have the 
advantages of fostering experimentation and innovation, and dispensing “the time-
consuming formality of traditional international organizations.”51
The literature has also begun to examine the consequences of the rise of 
transgovernmental networks.  For example, Raustiala argues that 
transgovernmental networks are “conduit[s] for the diffusion of regulatory ideas, 
rules, and practices” that can lead to international policy convergence.52  Raustiala 
also argues, along with Slaughter, that transgovernmental networks can improve 
compliance with international law.53  Transgovernmental networks may also 
contribute to world order by “increasing the scope, nature, and quality of 
international cooperation.”54
In addition, the transgovernmentalism literature suggests a variety of reasons for 
increases in transgovernmental interactions in general, including increased 
48 See supra Part II.B. 
49 SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 3, at 8-11.  Slaughter argues that “we 
need global rules without centralized power but with government actors who can be held to 
account through a variety of political mechanisms. . . . Government networks can help 
address [this] governance tri-lemma, offering a flexible and relatively fast way to conduct 
the business of global governance, coordinating and even harmonizing national government 
action while initiating and monitoring different solutions to global problems.  Yet they are 
decentralized and dispersed, incapable of exercising centralized coercive authority.  Further, 
they are government actors.”  Id. at 10-11. 
50 Slaughter, Global Economy, supra note 7, at 179-181.  The claim regarding 
accountability is controversial.  For an example of a more skeptical take on the question of 
network accountability, see, e.g., Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and 
Abuses of Power in World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29, 38-39 (2005).  In her 2004 
book, Slaughter acknowledges and responds to such accountability concerns, including the 
charge that transgovernmental networks will result in technocratic governance by unelected 
bureaucrats and the claim that transgovernmentalism distorts domestic political processes.  
See Slaughter, Global Economy, supra note 7, at 181 and SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, 
supra note 3, at chap. 6. 
51 Raustiala, supra note 9, at 24. 
52 Raustiala, supra note 9, at 51-70; see also SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra 
note 3, at 171-177. 
53 Raustiala, supra note 9, at 76-83; see also SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra 
note 3, at 183-186. 
54 SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 3, at 24 and 86-88. 
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regulatory interdependence;55 the proliferation of functionally similar regulatory 
agencies within states;56 increased levels of trade and resulting pressures for 
regulatory harmonization to address non-tariff barrier concerns;57 increased 
institutionalization of world politics;58 and technological change, which has made 
transgovernmental cooperation both more desirable (since the involvement of 
technically sophisticated government agencies can facilitate the regulation of issue 
areas characterized by increasing technical complexity)59 and possible (since 
technology provides the means of communication necessary for transgovernmental 
cooperation).60  As Raustiala summarizes, “[i]n short, three core factors—
technological innovation, the expansion of domestic regulation, and the rise of 
globalization—have promoted the development of networks.”61
These factors may help explain the overall rise of transgovernmentalism.  These 
factors, however, are general, macro-level phenomena and are therefore less useful 
for explaining variations in levels of transgovernmentalism across different groups 
of states and across different issue areas.  This leaves important questions about the 
form of international legal and regulatory cooperation largely unanswered.  What 
determines whether cooperation is likely to be transgovernmental or interstate?  
Why is legal and regulatory cooperation among some states and in some issue areas 
principally interstate, while among other states and in other issue areas it is 
primarily transgovernmental?  More generally, what accounts for varying levels of 
transgovernmentalism across different groups of states and across different issue 
areas?  With some exceptions,62 legal scholars and political scientists have devoted 
relatively little effort overall to finding answers to these questions, leaving a 
55 Keohane & Nye, Transgovernmental Relations, supra note 8, at 41-42. 
56 Raustiala, supra note 9, at 13. 
57 Pollack & Shaffer, supra note 22, at 27; Raustiala, supra note 9, at 12. 
58 ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE 210 (3d ed. 
2001) [hereinafter KEOHANE & NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE]; Keohane & Nye, 
Transgovernmental Relations, supra note 8, at 42 and 50; and Risse-Kappen, supra note 45, 
at 30-31. 
59 KEOHANE & NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE, supra note 58, at 210 
60 Raustiala, supra note 9, at 12. 
61 Raustiala, supra note 9, at 16. 
62 For an example of earlier work that addresses this issue, see Part III of the 1971 
special issue of International Organization on transnational relations, including the 
introduction to that part.  25 INT’L ORG. 519-521 (1971).  See also Keohane & Nye, 
Transgovernmental Relations, supra note 8, at 55, and KEOHANE & NYE, POWER AND 
INTERDEPENDENCE, supra note 58, at 271 and, generally, chap. 2 (noting that levels of 
interdependence vary by issue area, and that these varying levels may in turn affect the level 
of transnational and transgovernmental activity).  For a recent example of work addressing 
this issue, see Raustiala, supra note 9.  Raustiala’s theory is based on the proposition that 
incentives for interstate cooperation are lower when substantive regulatory differences are 
large, regulators do not want to compromise their own domestic systems, or regulatory 
power is highly asymmetric.  In those cases, transgovernmentalism is a likely alternative 
form of cooperation.  Id. at 16, 72-76, and 88-89. 
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significant gap in the literature on transgovernmental cooperation. 
III. A RATIONAL DESIGN THEORY OF TRANSGOVERNMENTALISM 
The primary goal of this article is to make a modest contribution toward filling 
this gap.  The article pursues this goal by developing a rational design theory of 
transgovernmentalism aimed at explaining variations in levels of 
transgovernmentalism across different groups of states and across different issue 
areas.  This part of the article proceeds in four steps to explain the theory.  First, it 
applies the theory of rational institutional design to the concept of 
transgovernmental relations, framing interstate versus transgovernmental as a 
design choice by heads of state and regulators.  Second, it states some of the 
preconditions for transgovernmental cooperation that the theory assumes have been 
satisfied.  Third, it identifies the theory’s dependent and explanatory variables.  
Finally, this part uses the rational design theory of transgovernmentalism to derive 
a series of conjectures about how the level of transgovernmentalism (the dependent 
variable) is likely to be affected by distribution problems; preference heterogeneity; 
enforcement problems; high politics; issue complexity; agency autonomy; and 
antecedent interactions in interstate organizations (the explanatory variables). 
A. Transgovernmental versus Interstate as a Design Choice 
This article applies rational institutional design theory to the concept of 
transgovernmentalism in order to understand transgovernmental versus interstate 
cooperation as a “design choice.”  Two different types of “designers” may seek to 
influence how cooperation is structured: (1) heads of state and other high-level 
officials (such as foreign ministers), and the diplomats and lawyers who negotiate 
on their behalf; and (2) regulatory agencies and individual regulators and 
government lawyers acting autonomously from the first type of designers.  For 
efficiency of expression, the article will henceforth refer to these two types of 
designers by using the terms “heads of state” and “regulators.”  Simply stated, the 
rational design theory of transgovernmentalism proposed in this article claims that 
whether legal and regulatory cooperation is interstate or transgovernmental depends 
largely on the rational choices of heads of state and regulators taking into account 
the costs and benefits of the two forms of cooperation.63  This section first 
63 This conceptualization implicitly assumes that heads of state and regulators are not 
only the leading actors in international cooperation but also the leading designers of the 
structures of international cooperation and that they are not influenced by other domestic 
political factors.  Moreover, in the context of delegation, this article conceptualizes the head 
of state as the principal and the regulators as agents.  Future research should involve relaxing 
these simplifying assumptions.  For example, in some cases domestic legislation might be 
used to specify the form of cooperation, making the design preferences of legislative bodies 
(as well as the preferences of interest groups that influence legislation) potentially significant 
in addition to the preferences of heads of state and regulators.  Moreover, in some issue areas 
and in some states, it may be more accurate to conceptualize the legislature as the principal 
WHYTOCK-RATIONAL TRANSGOVERNMENTALISM-BUILJ 10/1/2005  1:19:36 PM 
2005] TRANSGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND RATIONAL DESIGN  113 
 
discusses the choice, then the designers. 
1. The Design Choice 
Transgovernmental cooperation and interstate cooperation have different 
attributes, and therefore different costs and benefits.  The starting point for the 
rational design theory of transgovernmentalism is the assumption that designers 
consider these attributes in light of the problems they face, and make a rational 
choice between the two approaches based on their relative costs and benefits.64  
This approach is inspired by Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan 
Snidal’s recent work on the rational design of international institutions.  Their 
“basic strategy is to treat institutions as rational, negotiated responses to the 
problems international actors face.”65  Like them, this article’s “basic presumption, 
grounded in the broad tradition of rational-choice analysis, is that states use 
international institutions to further their own goals, and they design institutions 
accordingly.”66  This article also agrees with Koremenos et al. “that rational design 
can explain much about institutions, but not everything,”67 and that not all 
institutional design is the product of conscious design.68
The theory developed here, however, differs from Koremenos et al. in two 
respects.  First, while their approach is limited to explicitly agreed upon institutions 
and excludes “tacit bargains and implicit guidelines,”69 this article extends the 
argument of Koremenos et al. to transgovernmental networks, which often consist 
of just these sorts of “tacit bargains and implicit guidelines.”70  This extension, 
however, is consistent with Koremenos et al.’s logic of rational design.  As they 
who delegates functions to heads of state or regulators.  Incorporating these considerations 
into this article’s rational design logic would lead to a substantially more complex and 
difficult analysis, but may yield additional insights. 
64 Although this assumption makes intuitive sense, it should be noted that it is not 
uncontroversial.  Among other things, the deliberate efforts of “designers” are only one of a 
variety of factors that influence how cooperation is structured.  For an important critique of 
the concept of “design” in the context of domestic constitutions, see Donald L. Horowitz, 
Constitutional Design: An Oxymoron? 42 NOMOS 253 (2000).  In addition, although the 
rational choice approach is helpful for understanding transgovernmentalism, it is not the only 
approach that can produce insights.  Moreover, rational choice approaches have their own 
limitations.  For a critique of rational choice approaches in general, see DONALD P. GREEN & 
IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (1994).  For a critique of the 
rational institutional design approach, see Alexander Wendt, Driving with the Rearview 
Mirror: On the Rational Science of Institutional Design, 55 INT’L ORG. 1019 (2001). 
65 Barbara Koremenos et al., The Rational Design of Institutions, 55 INT’L ORG. 761, 768 
(2001). 
66 Id. at 762. 
67 Id. at 763. 
68 Id. at 766. 
69 Id. at 762. 
70 See infra Part II.B. 
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point out, “[e]ven institutions that are not highly formalized and arise through 
informal and evolutionary processes may embody significant rational design 
principles.”71
2. The Designers: Heads of State and Regulators 
The second difference between this article’s rational design theory of 
transgovernmentalism and the approach of Koremenos et al. relates to the actors 
that influence the design of cooperative frameworks.  Whereas Koremenos et al. 
emphasize the role of states,72 the present article argues that the relevant 
“designers” may also include regulators.  There are three steps to this argument.  
First, applying the concept of delegation, the head of state (the principal) is 
distinguished from the regulator (the agent) to which the head of state delegates 
regulatory functions.73  Second, regulators are assumed to be capable of acting 
independently from heads of state.74  The extent of this autonomy varies and thus 
the potential for agency slack (action by the agent that is neither authorized by the 
principal nor within the scope of discretion granted to the agent by the principal) 
also varies, depending on the extent and nature of the control mechanisms that the 
principal has put in place.75  Agent autonomy may also vary depending on 
asymmetrical expertise and information between the principal and agent.76
Third, it is assumed that the interests of regulators as agents may differ from the 
interests of the head of state as principal.  Specifically, the assumption is that 
regulators may have their own preferences about the design of institutions.  This 
argument is consistent with one of the central propositions of principal-agent 
71 Koremenos et al., supra note 65, at 767. 
72 Id. at 763 (also considering the role of non-state actors). 
73 On the concept of delegation and the principal-agent framework, see, e.g., PETER D. 
FEAVER, ARMED SERVANTS: AGENCY, OVERSIGHT, AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS (2003); 
D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION (1991); and 
Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Learning from Oversight: Fire Alarms and Police 
Patrols Reconstructed, 10 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 96 (1994).  For applications of the 
principal-agent framework to world politics, see Daniel L. Nielson & Michael J. Tierney, 
Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental 
Reform, 57 INT’L ORG. 241 (2003) and Darren Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel Nielson, and 
Michael J. Tierney, States, International Organizations, and Principal-Agent Theory, Nov. 
16, 2004 (unpublished manuscript, available at http://mjtier.people.wm.edu/papers/lake.pdf). 
74 This is a fundamental assumption of the principal-agent literature.  See, e.g., KIEWIET 
& MCCUBBINS, supra note 73, at 24. 
75 Hawkins et al., supra note 73, at 8-9.  These control mechanisms may include 
specifying rules rather than granting discretion; establishing monitoring and reporting 
requirements; carefully screening and selecting agents so that their preferences are as close 
to the principal’s as possible; devising institutional checks and balances; and providing for 
the imposition of sanctions in response to slack and rewards in the case of desired action.  Id. 
at 40-50; Nielson & Tierney, Delegation to International Organizations, supra note 73, at 
246. 
76 See, e.g., Lupia & McCubbins, supra note 73, at 100. 
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theory, namely that the principal and agent each seek to maximize its interests, 
leading to potential conflicts of interest between them, and that agents may behave 
opportunistically.77  It also is supported by the core claim of transgovernmentalists 
that the state “is disaggregating into its separate, functionally distinct parts.”78  If 
these parts on their own initiative are able to cooperate with their foreign 
counterparts, then they also should be able to influence the design of institutions for 
that cooperation.  Thus, the claim is that not only cooperation, but also decision-
making about the design of cooperation, is disaggregating. 
B. Preconditions for Transgovernmental Legal and Regulatory Cooperation 
This article’s rational design theory of transgovernmentalism assumes several 
necessary conditions for transgovernmental cooperation have been met.  First, it 
assumes the necessary conditions for cooperation in general (such as the potential 
for mutual gains) have been satisfied.79  The theory does not attempt to explain 
cooperation in general.  Rather, the theory takes cooperation as a given, and seeks 
to explain the extent to which it is transgovernmental versus interstate. 
Second, the theory assumes each of the states that are cooperating on an issue 
has an agency or other governmental subunit with legal or regulatory functions 
related to that issue.  Since transgovernmental cooperation is, by definition, 
cooperation at the level of governmental subunits, it is not possible unless all of the 
cooperating states have such subunits in the relevant issue area.  Closely related to 
this is a third assumption, that the relevant agencies have the resources (for 
example, staff and communications capabilities) enabling them to engage in 
cooperation with agencies in other states. 
77 KIEWIET & MCCUBBINS, supra note 73, at 5.  As indicated by the italics at the 
beginning of this paragraph, it bears emphasizing that the preferences of the principal and 
agent regarding the design of cooperation are not necessarily inconsistent.  For a much 
stronger version of the assumption, consult public choice theory, which “assumes that 
politicians, bureaucrats, and other decision-makers in public life are rationally self-
interested” and “attempt to maximize their personal power and wealth even when these 
selfish ends conflict with public-spirited goals.” Jonathan R. Macey, The ‘demand’ for 
international regulatory cooperation: a public-choice perspective, in TRANSATLANTIC 
REGULATORY COOPERATION: LEGAL PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL PROSPECTS 149-151 (George 
A. Bermann et al. eds., 2000).  For a challenge to the assumption that bureaucrats are 
necessarily opportunistic, see JOHN BREHM & SCOTT GATES, WORKING, SHIRKING AND 
SABOTAGE (1997). 
78 Slaughter, Real Order, supra note 5, at 184. 
79 For example, cooperation will not arise under zero-sum situations since “one actor’s 
loss is another’s gain;” nor will it arise in situations of harmony, in which case “there is no 
reason to create a regime, because each individual player, acting without regard for the 
behavior of others, maximizes both its own utility and that of the system as a whole.”  
Stephen D. Krasner, Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto 
Frontier, 43 WORLD POL. 336, 338 (1991). 
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C. Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
The rational design theory of transgovernmentalism seeks to explain the 
conditions under which legal and regulatory cooperation is most likely to be 
transgovernmental as opposed to interstate.  In other words, the dependent variable 
is transgovernmentalism.  Moreover, the theory implies a variety of factors that 
may influence designers’ choices regarding how to structure cooperation.  These 
factors, the theory’s explanatory variables, may help determine levels of 
transgovernmentalism.  These factors are the theory’s explanatory variables.  This 
section explains the dependent variable in more detail and briefly identifies the 
explanatory variables. 
1. Dependent Variable: Transgovernmentalism 
The dependent variable is transgovernmentalism.  The variable’s purpose is to 
measure the extent to which cooperation between two or more states on a given 
issue is transgovernmental versus interstate.  The concept of cooperation used in 
this article is based on a standard definition: 
Cooperation occurs when actors [which are not in pre-existent harmony] 
adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, 
through a process of policy coordination. . . . [C]ooperation takes place when 
the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners 
as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of a process of 
policy coordination.”80
This article emphasizes, however, that cooperation may include efforts to 
coordinate behavior before the behavior actually takes place.  That is, cooperation 
includes not only changing policies after the fact, but also working together to 
adjust policies during the policymaking process to ensure they are compatible in 
the first place.  Moreover, this article’s concept of cooperation explicitly includes 
interactions between heads of state or regulators, even if they do not in fact result in 
any observable policy changes, provided that these interactions directly relate to the 
given issue area.81  The goal is to establish the existence of interstate and 
transgovernmental structures for solving problems of mutual concern, not 
necessarily their effectiveness in solving these problems.82
80 KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 20, at 51-52. 
81 Even in situations where transgovernmental networks are “mere talking shops,” they 
are important.  As Slaughter points out, “[T]alk is the first prerequisite of information 
exchange; in the process, trust is fostered, along with an awareness of common 
enterprise. . . . Indeed, what sometimes starts as haphazard communication may lead officials 
to recognize the need and opportunity for coordination, across the range of domestic 
governmental concerns—from enforcement efforts to codes of best practices.”  Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, Everyday Global Governance, 132 DAEDALUS 83, 86-87 (2003). 
82 Although this article focuses on the causes of transgovernmentalism, the consequences 
of transgovernmentalism—including its effectiveness at solving problems of cooperation—
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Because of the difficulty of establishing a baseline with reference to which 
absolute levels of interstate and transgovernmental cooperation could be assessed, 
and because most areas of cooperation involve a mix of interstate and 
transgovernmental cooperation,83 this article uses a measure that aims to assess the 
relative levels of these two types of cooperation on a case-by-case basis.  For 
example, transgovernmentalism is low when cooperation is primarily interstate and 
the level of transgovernmental cooperation is comparatively low; and high when 
cooperation is primarily transgovernmental and the level of interstate cooperation is 
comparatively low. 
To determine levels of interstate and transgovernmental cooperation, the article 
looks for three types of evidence.  First, it determines whether there are agreements 
or other formal documents between heads or state (interstate) or regulators 
(transgovernmental) providing guidelines for cooperation on a given issue.  These 
documents are not only evidence of cooperation in the form of the negotiations 
leading up to agreement, but also evidence of the relative levels of interstate and 
transgovernmental cooperation intended by the parties.  Second, the article seeks 
quantitative data about interactions between heads of state and regulators in 
connection with mutual problems in the issue area as one way of assessing the 
actual levels of interstate versus transgovernmental cooperation.  Third, the article 
examines whether experts and practitioners from the cooperating parties 
characterize cooperation as primarily interstate or transgovernmental.84
2. Explanatory Variables 
This article focuses on seven explanatory variables that may help explain 
variations in levels of transgovernmentalism in legal and regulatory cooperation 
across different groups of states and different issue areas: (1) distribution problems 
(the extent of disagreement among actors about the preferred outcome when there 
are multiple Pareto-optimal equilibria); (2) preference heterogeneity problems (the 
extent to which divergence between actors’ fundamental preferences makes any 
agreement in a given issue area difficult); (3) enforcement problems (the extent to 
which actors have incentives to defect from a cooperative arrangement); (4) high 
politics (whether the intended cooperation involves “high politics,” such as national 
security or military issues, versus “low politics”); (5) issue complexity (complexity 
constitutes another interesting and important research agenda. 
83 Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer, Who Governs?, in Transatlantic Governance 
in the Global Economy 287, 301 (Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer eds., 2001). 
84 Although there are sources of empirical evidence that can be used to assess levels of 
transgovernmentalism, classifying this level in a given situation as “low” or “high” is, of 
course, a qualitative judgment.  Therefore, the case study in Part IV of this article presents 
the evidence in some detail so that the reader can critically evaluate judgments regarding the 
level of transgovernmentalism, as well as judgments about the values of other variables.  The 
author acknowledges the formidable challenges associated with the operationalization of the 
variables examined in this article, a challenge that must be addressed in further work on this 
project. 
WHYTOCK-RATIONAL TRANSGOVERNMENTALISM-BUILJ 10/1/2005  1:19:36 PM 
118 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol 23:nnn 
 
of the issue area in which states seek to cooperate); (6) agency autonomy (the 
autonomy of regulators in a given issue area); and (7) antecedent interaction (the 
extent of antecedent interactions among regulators in interstate organizations).85  
These variables are explained in more detail in the conjectures that follow. 
D. Conjectures about the Determinants of Transgovernmentalism 
In this section, a series of conjectures are derived from the rational design theory 
of transgovernmentalism.  Each of the conjectures contains a hypothesis about the 
relationship between the dependent variable, transgovernmentalism, and one or 
more of the explanatory variables. 
The baseline for the conjectures is the assumption that transgovernmental 
cooperation involves lower negotiating costs than interstate cooperation.86  
Transgovernmentalism therefore can be considered the “default mode” of 
cooperation before other costs and benefits are taken into account.  One reason 
interstate negotiating costs tend to be higher is they typically involve a higher level 
of diplomatic formality, which consumes the time of heads of state and their staffs’ 
resources.  When formal approval is needed within a state, as is often the case for 
interstate institutions, the diplomatic formalities are compounded by domestic 
political formalities.87  Transgovernmental networks, in contrast, are “fast, flexible 
85 In some cases, such interactions—to the extent they involve work on specific issue-
related problems—may be tantamount to one of the types of transgovernmental networks 
identified by Slaughter: networks within international organizations.  See supra text 
accompanying note 38.  Therefore, this explanatory variable cannot be applied to Slaughter’s 
first type of transgovernmental network—networks within international organizations—
without running the risk of circularity.  In other cases, such interactions are an independent 
factor that may facilitate future substantive interactions. 
86 Lower sovereignty costs might be another reason to prefer transgovernmental to 
interstate cooperation.  However, since interstate institutions can be designed to minimize 
sovereignty costs (see, e.g., Koremenos et al., supra note 65, at 771), sovereignty costs are 
not included in this analysis.  Moreover, it is possible that transgovernmental cooperation 
could be more expensive in one way, namely higher agency costs.  Delegation, however, can 
be designed to mitigate these costs.  See, e.g., Hawkins et al., supra note 73.  Therefore, 
although agency costs can never be eliminated in a principal-agent relationship, this article 
does not consider agency costs to be a decisive factor in the choice between 
transgovernmental and interstate cooperation. 
87 Negotiation costs are likely to be especially high in the case of relatively legalized 
interstate cooperation. 
“[A]doption of a highly legalized agreement entails significant contracting costs.  Any 
agreement entails some negotiating costs-coming together, learning about the issue, 
bargaining, and so forth—especially when issues are unfamiliar or complex.  But these 
costs are greater for legalized agreements.  States normally exercise special care in 
negotiating 
and drafting legal agreements, since the costs of violation are higher.  Legal specialists must 
be consulted; bureaucratic reviews are often lengthy.  Different legal traditions across states 
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[and] cheap.”88  They “bypass a great deal of cumbersome and formal international 
negotiating procedure”89 and typically involve a lower degree of legalization, 
resulting in lower negotiating costs.  Indeed, transgovernmental networks can be 
created almost spontaneously.90  As Slaughter notes, the use of “memoranda of 
understanding” (MOUs) and even less formal methods of agreement allow 
transgovernmental interaction to expand quickly, in contrast to the “lethargic pace” 
of traditional treaty negotiations.91
Conjectures 1 and 2 discuss conditions under which the benefits of interstate 
cooperation may outweigh these general benefits of transgovernmental cooperation, 
leading to lower levels of transgovernmentalism.  There are situations in which 
there may be compelling reasons for the designers of cooperation to prefer 
interstate cooperation notwithstanding the advantages of transgovernmentalism.  In 
contrast, conjectures 3, 4 and 5 discuss conditions under which there may be 
advantages of transgovernmental cooperation that are specific to a given group of 
states or a given issue area.  These advantages go beyond the baseline advantages 
discussed above and are likely to increase levels of transgovernmentalism. 
Conjecture 1: Transgovernmentalism decreases as distribution, preference 
heterogeneity or enforcement problems increase. 
Coordination, distribution, preference heterogeneity and enforcement problems 
are among the problems that actors may face when seeking gains from cooperation.  
Both transgovernmental and interstate structures of cooperation can be designed to 
facilitate cooperation under conditions characterized by simple coordination 
problems.  Under such conditions, actors are likely to prefer transgovernmentalism 
because, as discussed above, it generally is less costly than interstate cooperation.  
However, interstate institutions generally can be designed to mitigate distribution, 
preference heterogeneity, and enforcement problems more effectively than 
transgovernmental structures of cooperation.  Therefore, when any of these three 
types of problems exist, actors are, ceteris paribus, more likely to prefer interstate 
than transgovernmental cooperation.  Drawing on game theory, the following 
discussion explains coordination, distribution, preference heterogeneity, and 
enforcement problems, as well as possible institutional solutions and their 
relevance to levels of transgovernmentalism. 
Simple coordination problems exist when (1) the players need to coordinate their 
policies in order to avoid a mutually undesirable outcome; (2) there are multiple 
complicate the exercise.  Approval and ratification processes, typically involving legislative 
authorization, are more complex than for purely political agreements.” 
Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 
INT’L ORG 421, 434-436 (2000). 
88 Slaughter, Global Economy, supra note 7, at 179. 
89 Id. at 180. See also Raustiala, supra note 9, at 24. 
90 See SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 3, at 48-49 (describing spontaneous 
government networks). 
91 Id. at 49. 
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Pareto optimal equilibria (that is, there is more than one policy alternative around 
which the players can agree to coordinate that represents an equilibrium and has the 
property that no other alternative can make either player better off without making 
the other player worse off);92 and (3) the players are indifferent as to which Pareto 
optimal policy is agreed upon.93
Figure 1: Simple Coordination Problem94
 Coffee House Bar 









A “Simple Coordination Problem” game is depicted in Figure 1.  In this game, 
the two players are friends who wish to meet for a discussion.  They can either 
meet at the coffee house for a cup of coffee, or the bar for a glass of beer.  The 
choices available to one friend—referred to as the “row player”—are depicted in 
the rows (first row coffee house, second row bar) and the row player’s preferences 
are represented by the “payoffs” in lower-left corner of each cell of Figure 1.  The 
other friend is the “column player” whose payoffs are in the upper-right corner of 
each cell.  The important point is that each friend’s payoff depends not only on his 
or her own choice, but also on the choice of the other.  If the row player goes to the 
bar but the column player goes to the coffee house (or vice versa), they cannot have 
their discussion—the payoff for both friends is zero, as shown in the lower-left and 
upper-right cells.  If both friends, however, go to the coffee house or if they both go 
to the bar, each player gets a payoff of one, indicating they prefer that situation 
because they are able to have their discussion.95  The coordination problem faced 
 
92 One outcome “Pareto dominates” another outcome if all players are at least as well off, 
but at least one player is better off, with the first outcome rather than the second.  An 
outcome is “Pareto optimal” if there is no other outcome that Pareto dominates it.  In other 
words, when an outcome is Pareto optimal, there is no alternative outcome that can make 
any player better off without making another player worse off (i.e., the outcome cannot be 
improved without hurting at least one player).  An outcome is “Pareto sub-optimal” if it is 
not Pareto optimal, i.e., if an alternative outcome does exist that can make a player better off 
without making any other player worse off.  HERBERT GINTIS, GAME THEORY EVOLVING 28 
(2000); RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 91 (1982).  An equilibrium in two-player 
games such as those referred to in this article is “a pair of strategies, each of which is a best 
response to the other; i.e., each gives the player using it the highest possible payoff, given 
the other player’s strategy.” GINTIS at 6. 
93 Krasner, supra note 79, at 338-339; Hawkins et al., supra note 73, at 20; Lisa L. 
Martin & Beth A. Simmons, Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions, 
INT’L ORG. 729, 744 (1998). 
94 This problem is illustrated in Krasner, supra note 79, at 338-339, using a different 
scenario. 
95 Id.  
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by the two friends is a relatively simple one: they merely need to agree on where to 
meet.  In the language of game theory, they need to identify a “focal point” for 
coordination.96
Figure 2: Battle of the Sexes97
 Coffee House Bar 









The “Battle of the Sexes” game depicted in Figure 2 is also a coordination game, 
but it adds a distribution problem.  In the Battle of the Sexes: (1) the players 
(traditionally depicted as a male and a female) again need to coordinate their 
policies in order to avoid a mutually undesirable outcome (the lower-left or upper-
right cells, which do not provide any payoffs); (2) again, there are multiple Pareto 
optimal equilibria; that is, there is more than one outcome—the upper-left cell and 
the lower-right cell—that represents an equilibrium and has the property that no 
other alternative can make either player better off without making the other player 
worse off;98 but (3) the players are no longer indifferent as to which Pareto optimal 
policy is agreed upon: as the payoffs indicate, the column player would prefer to 
meet at the coffee house whereas the row player would prefer the bar.99
This third point is what introduces a distribution problem, and this is what 
distinguishes the Battle of the Sexes from the Simple Coordination Problem.  The 
distribution of the payoffs favor the column player if the meeting is at the coffee 
house and the row player if the meeting is at the bar.  In either case, they both get 
some payoff since they get to have their discussion, but since they are not 
indifferent to the meeting place, they will have to negotiate where to meet.  The 
problem is not—as was the case in the Simple Coordination Problem—merely to 
coordinate on a Pareto optimal outcome in order to avoid a Pareto sub-optimal 
outcome that neither player desires.  Now the problem is to resolve a conflict of 
interests regarding which Pareto-optimal outcome to select.  Ordinarily, this is a 
more difficult problem to solve than simple coordination and, as explained below, 
one that interstate structures generally are better able to mitigate than 
transgovernmentalism. 
 
96 Martin & Simmons, supra note 93, at 744. 
97 This game is illustrated in Krasner, supra note 79, at 339-340, using a different 
scenario. 
98 A move from the upper-left to the lower-right cell would make the row player better 
off by increasing her payoff from 2 to 3, but it would make the column player worse off by 
reducing his payoff from 3 to 2 (and vice versa).  The lower-left and upper-right cells make 
both players worse off. 
99 Krasner, supra note 79, at 339-340; Martin & Simmons, supra note 93, at 744. 
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Figure 3: Preference Heterogeneity100
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An even more difficult cooperation problem can be posed by preference 
heterogeneity.  A preference heterogeneity problem exists when two states cannot 
agree on cooperation due to fundamentally different preferences.  For example, in 
the one dimensional policy space depicted in Figure 3, states A and B may have 
ideal points a and b, respectively.  These points are different, indicating preference 
heterogeneity.  However, the status quo (indicated by point SQ) lies outside (in this 
case, to the left of) the range bounded by the two states’ ideal points.  This means 
that even though A and B have different preferences, they can both move closer to 
their ideal points by agreeing to move the status quo to the right, say to some point 
p that lies somewhere between point a and a plus the distance between SQ and a.  
Under these circumstances, A and B would both prefer such an agreement instead 
of the status quo. 
However, as the two states’ ideal points diverge (say, to points a’ and b’)—
representing increased preference heterogeneity—the status quo may lie between 
the two states’ ideal points.  In such a case, A would reject any proposal to the right 
of SQ because this would be farther from A’s ideal point, and B would reject any 
proposal to the left of SQ because this would be farther from B’s ideal point.  Thus, 
A and B will have little if any incentive to negotiate with each other, making 
cooperation unlikely.101  In the Simple Coordination Problem and Battle of the 
Sexes games, there is at least a possibility of agreeing to a solution that overcomes 
barriers to Pareto-improvement.  The lesson of Figure 3, however, is that high 
levels of preference heterogeneity and the configuration of ideal points relative to 
the status quo may preclude agreement. 
Figure 4: Prisoners’ Dilemma 










Even if coordination, distribution and preference heterogeneity problems are 
overcome and an agreement is reached on the terms of cooperation, there may be 
enforcement problems that make it difficult to sustain cooperation over time.  
Enforcement problems exist when individual actors have incentives to defect from 
an agreement.102  One way of understanding enforcement problems is by 
 
100 This figure and the discussion is generally based on the earlier version of Hawkins et 
al., supra note 73, dated December 4, 2003, at 42 (on file with the editors). 
101 This discussion is substantially based on id. at 40-41. 
102 Koremenos et al., supra note 65, at 776. 
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considering the implications of another game, the “Prisoners’ Dilemma.”  In this 
game, the two players are being held in a prison pending trial for a crime.  They are 
being interrogated in separate rooms and cannot communicate.  The prosecutor has 
only enough evidence to convict the prisoners of misdemeanors and keep them in 
prison for one year.  Therefore, if neither prisoner provides information to the 
prosecutor—that is, if the prisoners cooperate with each other—their sentences will 
both be relatively light, represented by the payoffs of 3 in the upper-left cell.  
However, if one of the prisoners defects by confessing and providing the prosecutor 
with incriminating evidence about the other prisoner, the prosecutor will drop all 
charges against the defecting prisoner and set her free—but, armed with the 
additional evidence, the prosecutor will now be able to convict the non-confessing 
prisoner of a felony and send him to jail for ten years.  For example, as shown by 
the payoffs in the lower-left cell, if the row player defects but the column player 
cooperates, the row player gets a payoff of 4 (the best possible outcome for her) but 
the column player gets a payoff of only 1 (the worst possible outcome for him).  If 
both prisoners confess—that is, if they both defect—they will each get eight years 
in jail (ten years for the crime, less two years for confessing), represented by the 
payoffs of 2 in the lower-right cell.103
In the Prisoner’s dilemma, each player’s dominant strategy is to defect.  This is 
because regardless of the column player’s move, the row player will get a higher 
payoff by defecting; and regardless of the row player’s move, the column player 
will get a higher payoff by defecting.  Therefore, the only equilibrium is in the 
lower-right cell (defect, defect).104 The dilemma is that in the lower-right cell both 
players get a relatively low payoff of 2—an outcome that is not Pareto optimal 
because there is another outcome, cooperate-cooperate in the upper-left cell, that 
could make both players better off.  One way of resolving the dilemma might be an 
agreement by the prisoners to cooperate with each other, and this is one reason why 
states in Prisoners’ Dilemma situations often seek international rules designed to 
restrain defection.105  But why should states be expected to comply with such rules 
when their dominant strategy is to defect?  Unlike the Simple Coordination 
Problem and the Battle of the Sexes in which the payoffs are 0 for both players if 
either defects, in the Prisoners’ Dilemma the row player can increase her payoff 
from 3 to 4 by defecting (as can the column player), creating incentives to defect.  
103 For accounts of the prisoner’s dilemma game, see GINTIS, supra note 92 at 19, 
Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International 
Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT’L L. 335, 358-360 (1989); and KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra 
note 20, at 68-69. 
104 Abbott explains this result in terms of offensive and defensive incentives.  
Offensively, each player wants to get the maximum payoff of 4, which can only happen if 
she defects. Defensively, each player wants to avoid the so-called “sucker’s payoff” of 1, 
which can only happen if he cooperates.  Abbott, supra note 103, at 359. 
105 Id. 
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106  This is the enforcement problem. 
It is important to note, however, that the conclusion that defection is the 
dominant strategy in the Prisoners’ Dilemma game depends on the assumption that 
the game is played only once or a small number of times.  In an iterated Prisoners’ 
Dilemma game—that is, when the game is played repeatedly by the same players—
the players may find it rational to cooperate instead.107  This is, as Keohane 
explains, because “in multiple-play Prisoners’ Dilemma, defection is in the long 
run unrewarding, since the short-run gains thereby obtained will normally be 
outweighed by the mutual punishment that will ensue over the long run,” including 
retaliatory defection by other players in future iterations of the game.108  Therefore, 
enforcement problems generally are not as serious in iterated or ongoing 
interactions as they are in single isolated interactions.  On the other hand, if the 
players do not sufficiently value the future gains of cooperation—that is, if the 
“shadow of the future” is not long enough—cooperation might not be 
sustainable.109
Finally, in addition to iteration, depth of cooperation may affect the seriousness 
of enforcement problems.  According to George Downs, David Rocke and Peter 
Barsoom, “depth of cooperation” refers to “the extent to which [an agreement] 
requires states to depart from what they would have done in its absence.”110  They 
argue that the greater the depth of cooperation, the higher the magnitude of 
enforcement that will be necessary to prevent defection.111
How can actors mitigate the problems of coordination, distribution, preference 
heterogeneity and enforcement that create barriers to cooperation?  Returning to 
Figure 1, the Simple Coordination Problem suggests that coordination problems are 
relatively easy to solve if they do not also involve distribution problems.  The 
players simply need to establish a focal point for coordination.  A basic tool of 
transgovernmentalism such as an informal memorandum of understanding could be 
used to accomplish this.  There is no need for an enforcement mechanism to ensure 
that the players don’t break from the agreed-upon focal point.  Because the players 
in Figure 1 have no disagreement between the upper-left (coffee house, coffee 
house) and lower-right (bar, bar) outcomes, and because these outcomes are both 
Pareto optimal (in this game, none of the other outcomes can make either player 
106 Or, using Abbot’s terminology, the offensive and defensive incentives to defect that 
are created by the payoff structure “pull inexorably toward non-cooperation.”  Id. at 362. 
107 KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 20, at 75-76; Abbott, supra note 103, at 
363. 
108 KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 20, at 75; Abbott, supra note 103, at 363.  
This outcome was demonstrated by ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 
(1984). 
109 Koremenos et al., supra note 65, at 781. 
110 George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about 
Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379, 383 (1996). 
111 Id. 
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better off), there is no incentive for either player to defect.112  Under these 
conditions, the more costly alternative of interstate cooperation will be “overkill” 
and transgovernmentalism will be more likely. 
In contrast, interstate structures of cooperation generally can be better designed 
than transgovernmental structures to mitigate the other three types of problems: 
distribution, preference heterogeneity and enforcement problems.  Most 
importantly, the scope of issues covered by an interstate institution may be 
increased to allow issue linkage.  Issue linkage can facilitate compromises across 
issue areas when preference heterogeneity or distribution problems might otherwise 
preclude cooperation.  In the case of preference heterogeneity, imagine that in 
addition to the policy space represented by Figure 3 there are other issue areas in 
which the actors are attempting to coordinate policies.  Even if state A’s ideal point 
is a’, A may be willing to agree to a coordination point that is to the right of the 
status quo and therefore farther from its ideal point but closer to B’s ideal point b’, 
provided that in the second issue area state B agrees to a coordination point that is 
closer to A’s ideal point.  More generally, if state A values the second issue more 
than the first, and state B values the first issue more than the second, “both can be 
made better off by exchange, that is, by agreeing to defer to each other on these 
issues.”113  Thus, by linking together two or more issue areas, the parties may be 
able to reach agreement even when one or more individual issue areas are 
characterized by a high degree of preference heterogeneity.  For this reason, the 
issue scope of rationally designed cooperative arrangements is likely to increase 
with greater preference heterogeneity.114
The same solution can be used to address distribution problems.  In the Battle of 
the Sexes game depicted in Figure 2, imagine that after their meeting the friends 
wish to go to a movie, that they would rather spend time together at the same movie 
than see separate movies, but that one friend prefers to see a comedy and the other 
a drama.  By linking together the coffee house-bar and comedy-drama issues, it 
may be easier to reach an agreement—one friend gets her preference for the bar in 
exchange for the other friend getting his preference for the comedy—than if the 
issues were treated separately.  Therefore, the issue scope of rationally designed 
cooperative arrangements is likely to increase with the severity of distribution 
problems.115  In summary, to use Keohane’s words, by linking issues under an 
interstate institution, “more potential quids are available for the quo.”  This can 
help mitigate both interest heterogeneity and distribution problems.116
112 Krasner, supra note 79, at 338. For example, if the players agree on the coffee house 
(upper-left cell), neither player can get a higher payoff by going to the bar instead. 
113 Koremenos et al., supra note 65, at 786. 
114 Id. at 785-786. 
115 Id. at 786. 
116 KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 20, at 91.  Or, as Koremenos et al. explain, 
“[l]inkage . . . may allow [actors] to overcome distributional obstacles.  When the benefits of 
an issue accrue primarily to a few, and the costs fall disproportionately on others, linkage to 
WHYTOCK-RATIONAL TRANSGOVERNMENTALISM-BUILJ 10/1/2005  1:19:36 PM 
126 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol 23:nnn 
 
In addition, increasing the scope of issues covered by an institution may help 
solve enforcement problems.  As noted above, in a Prisoners’ Dilemma situation, 
iteration over time can mitigate enforcement problems by altering incentives to 
defect.  As Kenneth Abbott explains, “[c]ooperation can also emerge and be 
maintained through ‘horizontal’ iteration—the linkage of different issue areas. . . . 
[L]inkage makes it possible for states to respond to cooperation or defection in one 
area with appropriate actions in another, much as in an iterated game.”117  In other 
words, even if two actors reach an agreement for coordinating a policy in an issue 
area, cooperation will be difficult to sustain if one of the actors later comes to value 
the benefits of defection in the present over the costs of defection in terms of lost 
benefits of cooperation in the future.  However, if this first issue area is linked to a 
second issue area, such that if an actor defects from cooperation on one issue area 
then the other actor will automatically defect from cooperation on the second one, 
the costs of the first party’s defection is now higher: it includes not only lost future 
cooperation in the first issue area, but also lost future cooperation in the second 
one.  By increasing the total costs of defection, issue linkage can reduce net 
incentives to defect, at least partially mitigating the enforcement problem.118  
Therefore, the issue scope of rationally designed cooperative arrangements is likely 
to be higher when enforcement problems are more severe.119
In addition to linking multiple issue areas, interstate institutions can be designed 
to mitigate enforcement problems by providing centralized enforcement 
mechanisms.  This can be accomplished by delegating enforcement powers to a 
third party.  For example, the third party might be empowered to punish defectors 
by withholding financial resources or imposing reputation costs.  When multiple 
issues are linked, the third party might be empowered to expel an actor who defects 
on one issue from the entire cooperative arrangement.  Moreover, the third party 
might be empowered to monitor compliance, making it less likely that defection 
will go undetected.120  Thus, centralized enforcement mechanisms like these can 
decrease the likelihood of defection by increasing the likely costs of defection.  
Because centralization is a way of mitigating enforcement problems, rationally 
designed cooperative arrangements are likely to have higher centralization when 
another issue with different distributional consequences allows cost-bearing states to be 
compensated by those who reap the gains.  When each state cares relatively more about one 
of two issues, linking the negotiations may be the mutually preferred option.  In particular, 
the more each state cares about ‘its’ issue, the more essential linkage becomes in an 
agreement.” Koremenos et al., supra note 65, at 786. 
117 Abbott, supra note 103, at 363. 
118 Koremenos et al., supra note 65, at 787; KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 20, 
at 103.  For example, “[t]he United States might be unable to resist domestic pressures to 
impose tariffs on European wine, for example, were it not for the realization that such action 
would invite retaliation from the Europeans on U.S. beef.” Koremenos et al., supra note 65, 
at 797. 
119 Koremenos et al, supra note 65, at 786-787. 
120 Id. at 790. 
WHYTOCK-RATIONAL TRANSGOVERNMENTALISM-BUILJ 10/1/2005  1:19:36 PM 
2005] TRANSGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND RATIONAL DESIGN  127 
 
enforcement problems are more severe.121
Transgovernmental networks, however, generally cannot offer these solutions to 
distribution, preference heterogeneity and enforcement problems to the same extent 
as interstate institutions.  First, while the issue scope of interstate institutions is 
variable by design, transgovernmental networks will usually be limited to a single 
issue area.  This is because transgovernmentalism typically involves interactions 
between specialized regulatory agencies, which themselves are not likely to deal 
with multiple issue areas.122  Second, transgovernmental networks typically are not 
centralized.  When transgovernmental networks do exhibit some degree of 
centralization, as is the case with transgovernmental regulatory organizations such 
as the Basel Committee, they usually do not involve delegation of enforcement 
powers.123  Therefore, when distribution, preference heterogeneity and 
enforcement problems are serious, rational designers may find that formal interstate 
institutions—particularly those creating issue linkage and centralization—are likely 
to be worth the higher costs of negotiating interstate structures of cooperation.124  
In contrast, if there are only simple coordination problems, rational designers are 
likely to find that transgovernmentalism is a more cost-effective form of 
cooperation. 
Conjecture 2: Transgovernmentalism decreases as high politics increases. 
“High politics” typically is defined as dealing with military and national security 
121 Id. at 789-790. 
122 In theory, almost any issue area can be divided into sub-issues, which raises the 
possibility of sub-issue linkage in transgovernmental networks.  For example, although the 
case study in this article focuses on E.U.-U.S. merger review cooperation, it is possible that 
this cooperation could be linked to cooperation on other sub-issue areas within the more 
general issue area of antitrust.  This conjecture does not take the possibility of sub-issue 
linkage into account.  However, additional case studies may show that this conjecture needs 
to be modified to consider this type of issue linkage within transgovernmental networks. 
123 SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 3, at 48.  Other examples of 
transgovernmental regulatory organizations identified by Slaughter include the International 
Organization of Securities Commissioners and International Network for Environmental 
Compliance and Enforcement.  Id.  As Slaughter notes, “Nothing [transgovernmental 
regulatory organizations] do purports to be legally binding on the members, and there 
typically are few or no mechanisms for formal enforcement or implementation.” Id.  This is 
not surprising, since heads of state are unlikely to allow regulators to delegate enforcement 
functions to a third party that could then be used against the state. 
124 This is not to say that transgovernmental networks offer no solutions to these 
problems whatsoever.  To the contrary, they can foster iteration by regularizing interactions 
between different states’ regulators, which may help solve Prisoners’ Dilemmas. See 
AXELROD, supra note 108 and KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 20.  Moreover, they 
may facilitate communication, and increased quantity and symmetry of information, which 
also may help mitigate these problems. Id.  However, the point remains that interstate 
solutions generally will be able to mitigate distribution, preference heterogeneity and 
enforcement problems more effectively and thus are more likely to be preferred by rational 
designers of cooperation when these problems exist. 
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matters, whereas “low politics” refers to other issue areas such as trade or the 
environment.125  This conjecture is based on the assumption that heads of state are 
less likely to surrender direct control over matters of high politics than over matters 
of low politics.126  This conjecture is not meant to suggest that there is no 
transgovernmental interaction in high politics.  To the contrary, even in areas of 
high politics cooperation is often necessary between governmental subunits of 
different states.127  Consistent with this article’s definition of 
transgovernmentalism as the level of transgovernmental cooperation relative to the 
level of interstate cooperation within a given group of states in a given issue 
area,128 most cooperation—including cooperation on matters of high politics—is 
likely to involve a mix of interstate and transgovernmental interaction. When high 
politics is involved, however, levels of interstate cooperation are likely to be higher 
due to heads of states’ insistence on tighter control, making the relative level of 
transgovernmental cooperation lower than when only low politics is involved. 
Conjecture 3: Transgovernmentalism increases as issue complexity increases. 
Transgovernmentalism is especially likely when high levels of expertise are 
necessary to understand and formulate policy in a given issue area.129  Regulatory 
agencies are specialized by design, and within agencies expertise often is even 
more narrowly defined by methodology and profession.130  Even when heads of 
state wish to be involved in an issue, they are likely to call on regulatory specialists 
to “ameliorate the uncertainties and help them understand the current issues and 
anticipate future trends” in complex areas such as monetary, macroeconomic, 
technological, environmental, health and population matters.131  An issue area may 
125 KEOHANE & NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE, supra note 58, at 20 (explaining the 
distinction as associated with realist international relations theory). 
126 See, e.g., Introduction, 25 INT’L ORG. 519, 520 (1971); Raustiala, supra note 9, at 5 
(“[s]ome critics argue that . . . networks may arise only in areas of ‘low politics’”).  The 
high-low politics distinction has been subject to substantial criticism.  See, e.g., KEOHANE & 
NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE, supra note 58, at 20-23 and Nye & Keohane, 
Transnational Relations, supra note 8, at 728-729 (1971).  Because the distinction retains 
significant currency among international relations scholars, this article nevertheless includes 
this conjecture in order to subject it to eventual empirical assessment. 
127 For example, consider cooperation between national militaries and defense 
bureaucracies in the context of interstate collective security arrangements such as the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
128 See infra text accompanying notes 80 to 84. 
129 KEOHANE & NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE, supra note 58, at 210.  Hawkins et 
al. make a similar point about delegation in general. Supra note 73, at 18.
130 For example, the FTC has several divisions, including the Bureau of Competition, 
which deals with antitrust.  Within the Bureau of Competition, there is a subunit dealing with 
merger review.  For an organizational chart of the Bureau, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/bcorgchart.pdf.  Merger review specialists include, among others, 
professional economists and lawyers. 
131 Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1, 12-13 (Winter 1992).  Actors may also desire flexibility in 
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be intrinsically complex for reasons of technology, methodology, or professional 
specialization, or it may be complex because of differences between national 
regulatory systems that make coordination highly complicated. 
Conjecture 4: Transgovernmentalism increases as agency autonomy increases. 
The more autonomy a legal or regulatory agency possesses in a given issue area 
or a given state, the more likely the agency is to engage in transgovernmental 
cooperation on the issue with foreign counterparts.  This conjecture is based on two 
assumptions. The first assumption is that regulators prefer transgovernmental 
cooperation to interstate cooperation.  This is because regulators are able to act 
more independently and with less direct supervision in transgovernmental 
cooperation than in interstate cooperation.132  Almost all regulatory agencies are 
subject to control mechanisms which significantly limit agency autonomy.  
Interstate cooperation, however, implies even more expansive control mechanisms 
and lower degrees of autonomy because heads of state are likely to supervise more 
closely regulators on issues that heads of state are directly engaged in.  Moreover, 
in interstate cooperation, the regulators frequently “stay home” waiting for 
instructions from high-level leaders about how to conduct their domestic regulatory 
activities.  In contrast, in transgovernmental networks, regulators interact directly 
with their counterparts abroad without any necessary increase in supervision from 
heads of state.133
It is one thing for regulators to prefer transgovernmentalism as the first 
assumption states, but it is another thing for them to be able to actually engage in 
transgovernmentalism.  The second assumption is that in order to engage in 
transgovernmental cooperation, regulators must either be directed to do so by the 
head of state or have sufficient autonomy to engage in transgovernmental 
cooperation on their own initiative.134  Given that regulators prefer 
issue areas where high levels of complexity lead to uncertainty. See  Koremenos et al., supra 
note 65, at 778 and 793 (hypothesizing that states are likely to design more flexible 
institutions when there is uncertainty about the state of the world). While transgovernmental 
cooperation generally is more flexible than interstate, interstate cooperation can be designed 
to be flexible. See id.  (discussing how interstate institutions can be designed to be flexible as 
a response to uncertainty). Therefore, this article does not include flexibility as a key 
consideration. 
132 As one U.S. government official put it, regulators are often afraid that high level 
involvement can mean the “kiss of death” for their informal yet productive interactions with 
their counterparts abroad.  Presentation of Peter Secor, Deputy Director, Office of European 
Union and Regional Affairs, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of 
State, to the Seminar on Transatlantic Relations, Duke University (Mar. 22, 2004). 
133 This type of direct interaction between government subunits is the essence of 
transgovernmentalism.  Many examples of transgovernmental interactions are documented in 
SLAUGHTER, supra note 3, including transgovernmental interactions among regulators 
(chapter 1), judges (chapter 2) and legislators (chapter 3). 
134 Autonomy is “the range of potential independent action available to an agent after the 
principal has established mechanisms of control.”  Hawkins et al., supra note 73, at 8-9.  
Control mechanisms may include specifying rules rather than granting discretion; 
WHYTOCK-RATIONAL TRANSGOVERNMENTALISM-BUILJ 10/1/2005  1:19:36 PM 
130 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol 23:nnn 
 
transgovernmentalism, they are likely to use the full extent of their autonomy to 
pursue transgovernmental cooperation even if they are not directed by the head of 
state to do so.  Therefore, this conjecture expects levels of transgovernmentalism to 
increase as agency autonomy increases. 
Conjecture 5: Transgovernmentalism increases as the extent of prior interactions 
among regulators in international organizations increases. 
This conjecture is based on the assumption that transgovernmental cooperation is 
more likely when regulators already have been interacting with each other in 
interstate institutions.  In other words, transgovernmental cooperation is more 
likely to emerge in issue areas where interstate institutions already exist.  Keohane 
and Nye’s early work on transgovernmentalism emphasized the importance of the 
institutional context of transgovernmental relations, noting that international 
organizations facilitate contact among domestic regulatory officials, and that 
transgovernmental behavior is likely to be “particularly important in issue areas in 
which functionally defined international organizations operate”.135  Recently, 
Thomas Risse has gone further, arguing that “[t]he emergence of 
transgovernmental coalitions seems to be almost entirely a function of highly 
cooperative and institutionalized interstate relationships.”136
To summarize the conjectures, transgovernmentalism, being less costly than 
interstate cooperation, is more likely when simple coordination problems are the 
only barriers to cooperation.  However, levels of transgovernmentalism are likely to 
be lower when distribution, preference heterogeneity or enforcement problems are 
more serious and in issue areas involving high politics.  Transgovernmentalism is 
likely to be higher when issue complexity, agency autonomy, and antecedent 
regulatory interactions in interstate organizations are higher. 
IV. THE CASE OF E.U.-U.S. MERGER REVIEW COOPERATION 
In Part III, this article developed a rational design theory of 
transgovernmentalism aimed at explaining variations in levels of 
transgovernmentalism across different issue areas and different groups of states.  
Part III then used the theory to derive a series of conjectures about seven variables 
that are likely to affect levels of transgovernmentalism: distribution, preference 
heterogeneity and enforcement problems; high politics; complexity; agency 
establishing monitoring and reporting requirements; carefully screening and selecting agents 
so that their preferences are as close to the principal’s as possible; devising institutional 
checks and balances; and providing for the imposition of sanctions in response to slack and 
rewards in the case of desired action.  Id. at 40-50; Nielson & Tierney, supra note 73, at 246. 
135 Keohane & Nye, Transgovernmental Relations, supra note 8, at 42 and 50. 
136 Risse-Kappen, supra note 47, at 30-31.  As noted above, in some cases, such 
interactions—to the extent they involve work on specific issue-related problems—may be 
tantamount to one type of network identified by Slaughter: transgovernmental networks 
within international organizations.  In other cases, such interactions are an independent 
factor that may facilitate future substantive interactions. 
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autonomy; and prior regulatory interactions in interstate organizations. 
Part IV of the article uses the case of European Union (E.U.)137-United States 
(U.S.) cooperation on antitrust issues to subject the rational design theory of 
transgovernmentalism to a preliminary empirical plausibility test.138  More 
specifically, this part focuses on merger review cooperation between the E.U. and 
U.S.  Part IV first provides a brief overview of antitrust (or competition) policy in 
general and merger review in particular, with an emphasis on E.U. and U.S. law 
and practice.  It then assesses the extent of interstate and transgovernmental 
cooperation in order to measure the level of transgovernmentalism in E.U.-U.S. 
merger review cooperation.  Third, Part IV examines each of the seven explanatory 
variables described in the conjectures of Part III. 
137 The E.U. arguably satisfies the criteria for a state under the traditional international 
legal definition. See supra note 1.  However, the E.U. is commonly considered to be a supra-
national institution.  In either case, E.U.-U.S. cooperation is appropriate for this study 
because of the E.U.’s competence in global antitrust issues.  See infra text at notes 116-117.  
Since transgovernmental versus interstate refers to the organizational level at which 
cooperation takes place, it can be descriptive not only of states, but also other hierarchical 
institutions.  In the case of the E.U., the president of the European Council (and, in certain 
cases, the president of the Commission) is the primary actor at the interstate level, and 
Commission staff members are the main actors at the transgovernmental level.  See Pollack 
& Shaffer, supra note 22, at 23. Current members of the E.U. are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, 
the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  The E.U.’s principal 
institutions include the European Parliament, which represents the E.U.’s citizens and is 
directly elected by them; the Council of the European Union, which represents the individual 
member states; and the European Commission, which seeks to uphold the interests of the 
Union as a whole.  For an overview of the E.U., visit EUROPA, at 
http://europa.eu.int/institutions/index_en.htm.  Until the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, which 
established the European Union, the E.U. was referred to as the European Community. See 
generally “The History of the European Union,” at 
http://europa.eu.int/abc/history/index_en.htm.  An overview of the history, institutions and 
activities of the E.U. is available at the E.U.’s web site at http://europa.eu.int/index_en.htm. 
138 Because it relies on only a single case study, this analysis cannot serve as more than a 
preliminary plausibility test of the rational design theory of transgovernmentalism.  See, e.g., 
GARY KING, ROBERT O. KEOHANE & SIDNEY VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC 
INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 211 (1994) (noting the limitations of single case 
studies).  More rigorous testing will require increasing the number of cases and reducing the 
number of explanatory variables.  Id. at 118-122.  Additional cases would need to be selected 
according to a carefully developed case selection strategy in order to mitigate selection bias.  
Id. at chap. 4.  Finally, improvements need to be made in the operationalization of concept of 
transgovernmentalism and of the explanatory variables, improvement that will depend on 
further theoretical and empirical work.  Therefore, the theory remains preliminary and the 
conjectures tentative. 
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A. Overview of Competition Policy and Merger Review 
Competition policy involves the regulation of business arrangements that hinder 
economic competition.  One branch of competition regulation is merger review, 
which involves the evaluation of proposed business combinations to determine 
whether the combinations are likely to have anticompetitive effects.  A merger can, 
in essence, turn two formerly competing companies into a single company, thus 
reducing competition.  Generally speaking, merger regulators will disapprove a 
merger if the surviving company is not likely to face significant competition after 
the proposed merger.139
1. Merger Review in the E.U. 
In the E.U., competition policy is enforced by the Directorate General for 
Competition (DGC) of the European Commission.140  The E.U. derives its merger 
review authority from a regulation issued by the Council of the E.U. on the control 
of concentrations between undertakings (the Merger Regulation).141  The Merger 
Regulation applies to all mergers with a “Community dimension,” defined 
primarily in terms of “aggregate worldwide turnover” and “aggregate Community-
wide turnover”—that is, aggregate turnover within the E.U. common market—of 
the companies planning to merge.142
139 See generally U.S. Department of Justice, “Antitrust Enforcement and the 
Consumer,” at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/div_stats/9142.pdf ; Federal Trade 
Commission, “A Guide to the Federal Trade Commission,” at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/general/guidetoftc.pdf [hereinafter FTC Guide]. 
140 See European Commission, “Mission of the Competition DG,” at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/competition/mission; See also European Commission, 
“Merger Notification and Procedures Template,” Jul. 2, 2004, at 3, at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/others/20040726template.pdf [hereinafter 
Merger Procedures]. 
141 See Council Regulation No. 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/legislation/.  This regulation entered into 
effect on May 1, 2004, replacing the E.U.’s prior merger regulation.  European Commission, 
“E.U. gives itself new merger control rules for 21st century,” press release dated Jan. 20, 
2004, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/legislation/regulation/. 
142 The preamble of the Merger Regulation states that E.U. merger regulations are for 
governing “those concentrations which may significantly impede effective competition in the 
common market or 
in a substantial part of it.”  Preamble, sec. 5.  More precisely, Art. 1, sec. 2 of the Merger 
Regulation provides: 
“A concentration has a Community dimension where: (a) the combined aggregate worldwide 
turnover of all the undertakings concerned is more than EUR 5,000 million; and (b) the 
aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is 
more than EUR 250 million, unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than 
two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member 
state.” 
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Companies planning a merger with a Community dimension must notify the 
DGC and provide it with substantial information relevant to the transaction prior to 
the closing of the transaction.143  The DGC then examines the notification to 
determine whether or not the merger is “compatible with the common market.”  A 
merger “which would significantly impede effective competition, in the common 
market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or 
strengthening of a dominant position, shall be declared incompatible with the 
common market”144 and will be prohibited.145  Ordinarily, the DGC must reach its 
decision within twenty-five working days following the receipt of notification, 
although it can increase the time period by an additional ninety working days if it 
determines that an in-depth inquiry is required.146
2. Merger Review in the U.S. 
In the U.S., two agencies, the Department of Justice (DOJ), through its Antitrust 
Division, and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), through its Bureau of 
Competition, are responsible for competition regulation, including merger 
review.147  These agencies enforce the Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers or 
acquisitions the effect of which “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to 
tend to create a monopoly.”148  In general, the Clayton Act requires that businesses 
planning a merger that exceeds a specified size threshold must notify the DOJ and 
the FTC of the proposed transaction and wait for a time period (usually thirty days) 
Merger Regulation art. 1, sec. 3 adds: 
“A concentration that does not meet the thresholds laid down in paragraph 2 has a 
Community dimension where: (a) the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the 
undertakings concerned is more than EUR 2 500 million; (b) in each of at least three 
Member States, the combined aggregate turnover of all the undertakings concerned is more 
than EUR 100 million; (c) in each of at least three Member States included for the purpose 
of point (b), the aggregate turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is 
more than EUR 25 million; and (d) the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at 
least two of the undertakings concerned is more than EUR 100 million, unless each of the 
undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide 
turnover within one and the same Member State.” 
143 Merger Regulation, art. 4, sec. 1.  Ordinarily, this notification is to occur after the 
signing of the merger agreement, but an exception allowing earlier notification is available 
when the parties demonstrate a “good faith intention to conclude an agreement.”  Merger 
Regulation, art. 4, sec. 1. 
144 Merger Regulation, art. 2, sec. 3. 
145 Merger Regulation, art. 7, sec. 1. 
146 Merger Regulation, art. 10, sec. 1 and sec 3.  See also European Commission, “New 
Merger Regulation frequently asked questions,” press release dated Jan. 20, 2004, available 
at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/legislation/regulation/. 
147 Federal Trade Commission, “Protecting Competition, Protecting Consumers: A Plain 
English Guide to Antitrust Laws”— Preface, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/compguide/index.htm [hereinafter FTC, Protecting Competition]. 
148 FTC, Protecting Competition—An Antitrust Primer. 
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before completing the transaction.149  If either agency decides further examination 
is necessary, that agency may make a “second request” for information and extend 
the waiting period.150  If the DOJ or FTC finds the proposed transaction may 
violate antitrust laws, that agency may seek a court order barring the transaction.151
3. Competition Policy and Globalization 
Globalization and a steep rise in the number of multinational mergers have made 
a purely domestic approach to merger regulation untenable.  As stated in the final 
report of the U.S. International Competition Policy Advisory Committee (ICPAC) 
in November 1997, “a key challenge stems from the recognition that law is national 
but markets can extend beyond national boundaries.”152  These circumstances 
provide incentives for transatlantic cooperation on competition matters.  The 
general problem is that “[i]nconsistent outcomes and conflicting or burdensome 
remedies imposed by multiple jurisdictions may significantly increase transaction 
costs.”153
For example, a merger between two companies in state A may have 
anticompetitive effects in state B.  Thus, both the E.U. and the U.S. apply their 
respective antitrust laws, including merger regulations, to transactions outside their 
respective borders that may have adverse effects within their respective borders.154  
If E.U. and U.S. regulators both find that the merger would have anticompetitive 
effects within their respective markets, then E.U. and U.S. regulators would have 
an incentive to cooperate to pursue their mutual interest in crafting remedies to 
mitigate those effects.  Since the merging parties would be incapable of satisfying 
149 Federal Trade Commission, “Introductory Guide I to the Premerger Notification 
Program,” at 1, at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/hsr/introguides/guide1.pdf [hereinafter FTC 
Premerger Guide].  In general, the parties to a merger must file a notification if all of the 
following conditions are met: (a) One person has sales or assets of at least $100 million; (b) 
The other person has sales or assets of at least $10 million; and (c) As a result of the 
transaction, the acquiring person will hold an aggregate amount of stock and assets of the 
acquired person valued at more than $50 million; or (d) As a result of the transaction, the 
acquiring person will hold an aggregate amount of stock and assets of the acquired person 
valued at more than $200 million, regardless of the sales or assets of the acquiring and 
acquired persons.  Id. at 2-3. 
150 Id. at 1. 
151 Id. at 2. 
152 INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE (ICPAC) TO THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL AND ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR ANTITRUST, FINAL REPORT 2 
(2000), at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.htm [hereinafter ICPAC, FINAL 
REPORT]. 
153 Id. at 4. 
154 Merit E. Janow, Transatlantic Cooperation on Competition Policy, in ANTITRUST 
GOES GLOBAL: WHAT FUTURE FOR TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION? 30-31 (Simon J. Evenett 
et al. eds. 2000); Youri Devuyst, Transatlantic Competition Relations, in TRANSATLANTIC 
GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 130 (Mark A. Pollack and Gregory C. Shaffer eds., 
2001). 
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conflicting sets of remedies, E.U. and U.S. regulators in such cases have a specific 
incentive to ensure that their remedies are consistent. 
On the other hand, state A and state B may disagree about the effects of a 
proposed merger.  One state may approve it, and the other may prohibit it.  From 
the perspective of the companies seeking to merge, this makes the transaction 
impossible.  Thus, state A and state B in essence have a veto power over mergers 
that the other may have approved.155  “The ruling of the most restrictive 
jurisdiction with respect to a proposed merger ultimately will prevail.”156  For 
example, even though U.S. regulators approved the 2001 proposed merger between 
General Electric and Honeywell, two U.S. companies, the E.U. prohibited it, 
finding that it would give the merged company a dominant position in relevant 
markets.157  The risk of such outcomes provides another strong incentive for 
regulators to cooperate with the aim of avoiding contradictory decisions. 
B. Assessing Transgovernmentalism in E.U.-U.S. Merger Review Cooperation 
Now that this part of the article has provided some general background on E.U. 
and U.S. merger review policy and practices and the impact of globalization on 
merger regulation, it proceeds to evaluate the  conjectures presented in Part III by 
applying them to the case of E.U.-U.S. merger review cooperation.  This section 
focuses on the dependent variable, transgovernmentalism.  As the following 
discussion of interstate and transgovernmental elements demonstrates, the level of 
transgovernmentalism in E.U.-U.S. merger review cooperation is high.158
1. Interstate Elements 
There is no formal interstate institution governing E.U.-U.S. cooperation on 
merger review.  There is, however, a series of interstate declarations urging more 
transgovernmental cooperation on competition matters in general.  First, in 1990, 
155 Simon J. Evenett et al., Antitrust Policy in an Evolving Global Marketplace, in 
ANTITRUST GOES GLOBAL: WHAT FUTURE FOR TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION? 22 (Simon J. 
Evenett et al. eds. 2000). 
156 Timothy J. Muris, Merger Enforcement in a World of Multiple Arbiters, remarks 
delivered to Brookings Institution, Dec. 21, 2001, at note 33, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/brookings.pdf.  Muris continues, “Consequently, 
disagreements among regulators may lead businesses to restrict their merger activity to 
transactions that will be acceptable to all jurisdictions.  As a result, merger activity may fall 
to sub-optimal levels, as businesses are dissuaded from negotiating transactions that most 
jurisdictions would view as competitively benign, out of concern that the most restrictive 
jurisdiction would block those transactions.” Id. 
157 Dimitri Giotakos et al., General Electric/Honeywell - An Insight into the 
Commission’s Investigation and Decision, COMPETITION POL’Y NEWSL., Oct. 2001, at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp2001_037_en.pdf. 
158 This characterization is consistent with prior studies of competition policy 
cooperation.  See, e.g., Slaughter, Global Economy, supra note 6, at 179 and 191; and 
Raustiala, supra note 8, at 35-44. 
WHYTOCK-RATIONAL TRANSGOVERNMENTALISM-BUILJ 10/1/2005  1:19:36 PM 
136 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol 23:nnn 
 
U.S. President George Bush and European Commission President Jacques Delors 
signed the Transatlantic Declaration on E.C.-U.S. Relations (TAD).159  The TAD 
declared that the E.U. and U.S. would continue to develop dialog on matters 
including competition policy.160
In 1995, Jacques Santer, President of the European Commission, Felipe 
Gonzalez, President of the E.U. Council of Ministers and Prime Minister of Spain, 
and President Bill Clinton of the United States, endorsed the New Transatlantic 
Agenda (NTA).161  The NTA states that the E.U. and U.S. “will address in 
appropriate fora problems where trade intersects with . . . competition policy.”162  
In the accompanying Joint E.U.-U.S. Action Plan, the parties stated they: 
will pursue work on the scope for multilateral action in the fields of trade and 
competition policy.  Our competition authorities will cooperate in working with 
other countries to develop effective antitrust regimes. . . . We will pursue, and build 
on, bilateral cooperation in the immediate term based on the E.C.-U.S. Agreement 
of 1991 [discussed below]. We will examine the options for deepening cooperation 
on competition matters, including the possibility of a further agreement.163
At the London E.U.-U.S. Summit of May 18, 1998, President Bill Clinton, Prime 
Minister Tony Blair, and Commission president Santer issued a statement on the 
Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP).164  In this statement,  the E.U. and U.S. 
agreed to “exchange views inter alia on issues relating to the question of 
multilateral rules on competition law and its enforcement, and on means of 
enhancing international cooperation among competition authorities in relation to 
anticompetitive practices with a significant impact on international trade and 
investment,” at upcoming World Trade Organization (WTO) meetings.  The E.U. 
and the U.S. also stated that they “will continue to explore possibilities for further 
cooperation in the implementation of [E.U. and U.S.] competition laws.”165
159 Pollack & Shaffer, supra note 22, at 14. 
160 Transatlantic Declaration on E.C.-U.S. Relations, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/eu-us/pub/decl.html. 
161 “A New Era For Transatlantic Relations,” European Union press release dated 
December 3, 1995, available at http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/tr02.html. 
162 New Transatlantic Agenda, available at http://www.eurunion.org/partner/agenda.htm. 
163 Joint E.U.-U.S. Action Plan, available at 
http://www.eurunion.org/partner/actplan.htm. 
164 White House Office of Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: The Transatlantic Economic 
Partnership, May 18, 1998, available at 
http://www.useu.be/TransAtlantic/TEP/partn518.html. 
165 Links to the full text of the TAD, NTA and TEP are available from the E.U. 
Commission’s website: for the TAD, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/us/economic_partnership/declaration_1990.htm
; for the NTA, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/us/new_transatlantic_agenda/index.htm; and 
for the TEP, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/us/economic_partnership/trans_econ_partner_1
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In summary, the E.U. and U.S. have made statements at the interstate level that 
they will cooperate on competition matters, particularly as they relate to trade.  The 
cooperation called for in these statements, however, is principally 
transgovernmental, and these E.U.-U.S. statements do not mention merger review.  
Nevertheless, this evidence suggests that E.U. and U.S. heads of state generally are 
supportive, at least in principle, of transgovernmental cooperation on competition 
matters. 
2. Transgovernmental Elements 
There is considerable transgovernmental cooperation between the E.U. and the 
U.S. on merger review matters, as evidenced by formal agreements, cooperation on 
specific merger review cases, and expert accounts.  In September 1991, European 
Competition Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan, U.S. Attorney General William P. 
Barr and Federal Trade Commission Chairman Janet D. Steiger signed the 
“Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Commission of the European Communities regarding the application of their 
competition laws” (the 1991 Agreement).166  The 1991 Agreement contains 
guidelines for notification by the parties to each other “whenever its competition 
authorities become aware that their enforcement activities may affect important 
interests of the other Party”; the exchange of information by “appropriate officials 
from the competition authorities of each party”; coordination by competition 
authorities in enforcement activities; and prompt consultation at the request of 
either party “at the appropriate level, which may include consultations between the 
heads of the competition authorities concerned.”167
In 1999, E.U. and U.S. competition authorities adopted the “Administrative 
Arrangement on Attendance” (AAA), which provides guidelines for “reciprocal 
attendance at certain stages of the procedures in individual cases involving the 
1_98.htm. 
166 Europe Information Service, European Report, “EEC/U.S.: Competition Pact Aims 
for New Level of Cooperation,” Sept. 25, 1991.  The text of the 1991 Agreement is available 
at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/international/bilateral/documents/us3_en.html. 
167 1991 Agreement, art. II(1), art. III(2), art. IV(1) and art. VII(1).  The 1991 Agreement 
is an executive agreement under U.S. law, meaning that it was not ratified by the Senate.  As 
such, it is a formal, binding international agreement.  Unlike a treaty, however, an executive 
agreement does not override any provisions of U.S. law with which it may be inconsistent.  
Moreover, unlike many other executive agreements, the 1991 Agreement was not entered 
into by the U.S. president.  Rather, it was entered into by the FTC and DOJ on behalf of the 
U.S. government, after being approved by the Department of State.  Similarly, on the 
European side it was signed by the Competition Commissioner.  Only after the European 
Court of Justice held in 1994 that the European Commission was not competent to conclude 
the 1991 Agreement did the E.U. Council approve the agreement, effective as of its original 
signing.  John J. Parisi, Enforcement Cooperation among Antitrust Authorities, May 19, 
1999, at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/ibc99059911update.htm; Devuyst, supra note 
154, at 134-136. 
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application of their respective competition rules”.168  In October 2001, FTC 
Chairman Timothy J. Muris and Assistant Attorney General Charles A. James, E.U. 
Competition Commissioner Mario Monti, and other antitrust authorities endorsed 
the creation of the International Competition Network (ICN) to provide a venue 
where senior antitrust officials from developed and developing countries will work 
to reach consensus on proposals for procedural and substantive convergence in 
antitrust enforcement.169  The ICN has established a working group aimed at 
addressing “the challenges of merger review in a multi-jurisdictional context.”170  
In addition to providing a central source of information about participants’ merger 
review rules and procedures, the working group has produced a variety of 
guidelines and recommended practices to facilitate cooperation and regulatory 
convergence.171
In October 2002, FTC Chairman Muris, Assistant Attorney General James, and 
E.U. Competition Commissioner Monti, released a set of “best practices” 
containing detailed guidelines for coordinating merger reviews (Best Practices).172  
The Best Practices include provisions for coordination on timing, collection and 
evaluation of evidence, communication between reviewing agencies, and crafting 
remedies and settlements.173  The Best Practices were a product of the U.S.-E.U. 
168 See “Background information-United States of America,” at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/international/bilateral/background/us1_en.html.  On 
June 4, 1998, Attorney General Janet Reno and Federal Trade Commission Chairman Robert 
Pitofsky, on behalf of the United States and Karel Van Miert, European Commissioner for 
Competition Policy, and Margaret Beckett, the United Kingdom’s Secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry on behalf of the Council of the European Union, signed an “Agreement 
between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America on 
the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of Their Competition 
Laws” (the 1998 Agreement).  The 1998 Agreement does not, however, apply to mergers. 
Federal Trade Commission press release, June 4, 1998, “United States and European 
Communities Sign Agreement on ‘Positive Comity’ in Antitrust Enforcement.”  
www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/06/positive.htm. 
169 See Federal Trade Commission press release dated October 25, 2001, “U.S. and 
Foreign Antitrust Officials Launch International Competition Network,” at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/10/icn.htm. The ICN’s website, where the full text of the 
memorandum establishing the ICN can be found, is 
www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org. 
170 See International Competition Network, Merger Review Working Group at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/mergers.html. 
171 See International Competition Network, Merger Review Working Group, Merger 
Documents, at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/mergersdocuments.html. 
172 Federal Trade Commission, United States and European Union Antitrust Agencies 
Issue “Best Practices” for Coordinating Merger Reviews, Press Release dated Oct. 30, 2002, 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/10/eugidelines.htm.  This press release has a link to 
the full text of the Best Practices. 
173 The full text of the Best Practices on Cooperation in Merger Investigations 
[hereinafter “Best Practices”] is at www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/10/mergerbestpractices.htm. 
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Merger Working Group, which is a group of lawyers and economists from the FTC, 
the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, and the E.U.174
In addition to these formal statements, there has been substantial interaction 
between E.U. and U.S. competition regulators in merger review activities.  In 1997 
alone, the E.U. notified the U.S. of thirty-one merger investigations that implicated 
U.S. interests, and the U.S. notified the E.U. of twenty merger investigations, 
which means that almost half of the merger matters before the FTC that year 
involved some level of interaction with foreign competition authorities.175  
Between 1991 and 1999, E.U. and U.S. antitrust agencies contacted each other in 
689 antitrust cases, including 473 merger cases that had a transatlantic 
dimension.176  According to FTC Chairman Muris, there were seventy-five merger 
cases during this time period where there was communication between E.U. and 
U.S. regulators that confirmed decisions to clear, clear with undertakings, or 
challenge proposed mergers.177  E.U. and U.S. regulators also have cooperated on 
crafting consistent remedies in several merger cases, such as WorldCom/MCI, 
Guinness/GrandMetropolitan and Dresser/Halliburton.178
Cooperation can not only enhance coordination on remedies, but also help avoid 
unnecessary duplication of work and costs, “both for the competition authorities 
involved and for the businesses whose conduct is subject to review.”179  For 
example, in the Dresser/Halliburton merger in 1998, involving two U.S. companies, 
the Commission was kept informed about remedy negotiations but deferred to U.S. 
regulators in negotiating an acceptable divestiture.  “Although it had to formally 
approve the merger, the Commission could do so without much additional action, 
explicitly taking into account the remedies obtained by the U.S. authorities.”180
This evidence of transgovernmental cooperation is consistent with the findings 
of practitioners and other experts.  On the E.U. side, Alexander Schaub, formerly 
the European Commission’s Director General for competition, commented that 
“staff level contacts have become a daily routine in our work” and noted that 
merger control is “the area where daily U.S.-E.U. cooperation has reached the most 
174 Federal Trade Commission press release dated October 30, 2002, “United States and 
European Union Antitrust Agencies Issue ‘Best Practices’ for Coordinating Merger 
Review.” www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/10/euguidelines.htm. 
175 Janow, supra note154, at 42. 
176 Devuyst, supra note 154, at 138. 
177 Muris, supra note 156, at note 15. 
178 Devuyst, supra note 154, at 139 and 141.  Devuyst distinguishes between two types 
of cases that are dealt with in transatlantic merger cooperation.  First, there are mergers 
involving a “truly transatlantic (or global) market.”  Second, there are transatlantic mergers 
that involve separate national markets.  Devuyst explains that cooperation on both types of 
mergers focuses on coordinating the remedies with which the merging companies must 
comply in order for the merger to be approved by regulators.  Id. at 139. 
179 Id. at 131-132. 
180 Id. at 141. 
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advanced stage.”181  On the U.S. side, former FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky noted 
in 2000 that “virtually all knowledgeable observers agree that there has been 
substantial convergence in the method and content of merger enforcement in the 
E.C. and U.S., and a remarkable improvement in coordination and cooperation 
between the two enforcement authorities” and that this was a result of “thoughtful 
and intensive efforts” of antitrust regulators on both sides of the Atlantic.182
John Parisi, Counsel for European Union Affairs in the International Antitrust 
Division of the FTC, described E.U.-U.S. antitrust cooperation as follows: 
The process . . . is conducted and overseen by professional staff in the 
international departments of the agencies.  These public servants are grounded in 
their own agency’s law and practices and have acquired expertise about other 
systems.  They have gotten to know and trust their counterparts and they serve as 
the diplomats who bring together the investigative staffs and help to bridge 
language, knowledge, and analytical gaps between the investigators.183
Similarly, Columbia University professor and antitrust attorney Merit Janow 
summarizes E.U.-U.S. cooperation as follows: 
[C]ooperation between U.S. and European competition authorities appears to 
have deepened and broadened and become regularized.  Such cooperation has 
not, however, become formulaic.  Interaction between officials at all levels is 
now commonplace.  Discussion can include a review of product markets, 
timing of respective procedures, and consideration of relevant geographic 
markets.  In a number of cases, [DGC] and FTC staffs share their views on 
the appropriate definition of product and geographic markets, possible 
competitive effects, and potential remedies.184
In summary, formal agreements, cooperation on specific merger review cases, 
and expert accounts indicate that levels of transgovernmentalism are high in E.U.-
U.S. merger cooperation. 
3. Assessment 
The foregoing evidence suggests that E.U.-U.S. merger review cooperation is 
181 See Alexander Schaub, “Co-operation in Competition Policy Enforcement between 
the E.U. and the U.S. and New Concepts Evolving at the World Trade Organisation and the 
International Competition Network,” Apr. 4, 2002, at 9-10, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp2002_013_en.pdf. 
182 Robert Pitofsky, “E.U. and U.S. Approaches to International Mergers—Views from 
the U.S. Federal Trade Commission” (pt. III(B)(1)), Sept. 14-15, 2000, available at 
www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/pitintermergers.htm. 
183 See John J. Parisi, Enforcement Cooperation among Antitrust Authorities, May 19, 
1999, available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/ibc99059911update.htm. 
184 Janow, supra note 154, at 42; see also Merit E. Janow, Transatlantic Regulatory 
Cooperation in Competition Policy: The Case for ‘Soft Harmonization’ and Multilateralism 
over New Bilateral U.S.-E.U. Institutions, in TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION: 
LEGAL PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL PROSPECTS 256 (George A. Bermann et al. eds., 2000). 
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primarily transgovernmental.  More specifically, the evidence suggests that this 
transgovernmental cooperation is what Slaughter would refer to as “spontaneous” 
transgovernmentalism in that it arises above all from agreements among domestic 
regulatory agencies (such as the 1991 Agreement, the AAA, and the Best Practices) 
and with relatively little interstate involvement.185  Alternatively, although the 
TAD, NTA and TEP do not expressly refer to merger review cooperation, they 
might be understood as providing the basis for Slaughter’s second type of 
transgovernmentalism, that which arises within a framework agreed upon by heads 
of state.186
C. Explaining Transgovernmentalism in E.U.-U.S. Merger Cooperation 
1. Distribution Problems 
Even if the E.U. and the U.S. generally agree on the overarching goals of merger 
review policy and recognize that they both can gain from merger review 
cooperation, they do not necessarily agree completely on what the best policies are 
for accomplishing those goals.  There are some differences between the preferences 
of the E.U. and the U.S. regarding the exact policies around which they should 
coordinate their merger review activities.  These differences introduce a moderate 
level of distribution problems into E.U.-U.S. merger review cooperation. 
These differences relate to both substantive and procedural preferences.  
Substantively, there are, for example, different views regarding the treatment of 
government subsidies, analysis of mergers involving vertical integration, and the 
scope of business activity that is subject to review.187  Moreover, “the E.U. has 
displayed considerably less appreciation [than the U.S.] for merger defenses based 
185 See supra Part II.B. 
186 See supra Part II.B.  However, at least one expert doubts the importance of these 
interstate elements, arguing that competition cooperation emerged independently from the 
NTA the TEP.  Devuyst, supra note 154, at 127.  Devuyst suggests that “the frequent 
gatherings of FTC, Department of Justice, and European Commission officials” has been 
more important than the interstate legal framework for fostering cooperation.” Id. at 134. 
187 Devuyst, supra note 154, at 143-146; see also Bevin MB Newman and Marta 
Delgado Echevarria, Gaps and Bridges: Transatlantic Cooperation, EUR. ANTITRUST REV. 
26, 27 (2005) (quoting commissioner Mario Monti), available at 
http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/ear/eu_us.cfm; see, e.g., Debra A. Valentine & 
Raj De, Transatlantic Similarities and Differences in Merger Policy: How the United States 
and the European Union Evaluate Transactions 4-5, BUS. ECON., Oct. 2002, available at 
http://www.findarticles.com/cf_dls/m1094/4_37/94774173/print.jhtml; Philip Mardsen, The 
Divide on Verticals, in ANTITRUST GOES GLOBAL: WHAT FUTURE FOR TRANSATLANTIC 
COOPERATION? chap. 6 (Simon J. Evenett et al. eds. 2000).  An example regarding the scope 
of business activity covered by E.U. and U.S. antitrust law is given by Muris: some 
exclusive agreements such as exclusive territorial rights agreements may be unlawful in the 
E.U. but permitted in the U.S.  Muris, supra note 156. 
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on efficiency arguments.”188 Procedurally, there are differences regarding the 
treatment of confidential information, the timing of merger review, the involvement 
in the review process of competitors of the parties proposing to merge, and the role 
of the judiciary in merger review enforcement.189  In the view of one U.S. 
regulator, “the similarities among competition laws and their enforcement are 
greater than their differences.”190  Similarly, in the words of former FTC Chairman 
Muris, “[w]e should . . . keep the impact of those differences in perspective.  They 
are too great to ignore, but not so great as to jeopardize either most transatlantic 
business activity or transatlantic antitrust enforcement cooperation.”191
These examples and expert observations suggest that E.U.-U.S. merger review 
cooperation is not a Simple Coordination game such as the one depicted in Figure 
1: even though the E.U. and the U.S. have a common interest in avoiding the Pareto 
suboptimal 0 payoffs associated with non-cooperation and generally have the same 
goals regarding merger review, they are not indifferent as to the choice of policy 
used to pursue those goals.  Thus, E.U.-U.S. merger review cooperation is probably 
more like the Battle of the Sexes game depicted in Figure 2.  The upper-left cell 
might represent the E.U.’s preferred policy option, and the lower-right cell the 
U.S.’s preferred policy option.  The payoffs illustrate the distributional 
consequences of the choice between the two policies: whereas the E.U. gets a 
payoff of 3 if the agreement is on its preferred policy, it only gets a payoff of 2 if 
the agreement is on the U.S.’s preferred policy.  This analysis suggests that E.U.-
U.S. merger review cooperation does involve moderate distribution problems. 
2. Preference Heterogeneity 
E.U.-U.S. merger review cooperation involves a low level of preference 
heterogeneity.  The E.U. and the U.S. generally agree on the overarching policy 
goal of merger review: to prevent business combinations that have anticompetitive 
effects.  The preamble of the Merger Regulation expresses the E.U.’s goal of 
ensuring that mergers “[do] not result in lasting damage to competition.”  Similarly, 
the U.S. Clayton Act’s merger provisions are aimed at preventing transactions the 
effect of which “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a 
monopoly.”192
The similarity of the merger review policy goals of the E.U. and the U.S. are 
also evident is less formal agency statements.  According to the FTC: 
Most mergers actually benefit competition and consumers by allowing firms 
to operate more efficiently.  In a competitive market, firms pass on these 
188 Evenett et al., supra note 155, at 20. 
189 Devuyst, supra note 154, at 147-148; Newman & Echevarria, supra note 187, at 28; 
Valentine & De, supra note 187. 
190 Parisi, supra note 167, at section I. 
191 Muris, supra note 156, at 1. 
192 15 U.S.C. 18 (sec. 7 of the Clayton Antitrust Act (1914). 
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lower costs to consumers.  But some mergers, by reducing competition, can 
cost consumers many millions of dollars every year in the form of higher 
prices and reduced product quality, consumer choice and innovation.  The 
Bureau of Competition reviews mergers to determine which ones have the 
potential to harm consumers; thoroughly investigates those that may be 
troublesome; and recommends enforcement action to the Commission when 
necessary to protect competition and consumers.193
Likewise, according to the DGC: 
The control of mergers and acquisitions is one of the pillars of European 
Union competition policy.  When companies combine via a merger, an 
acquisition or the creation of a joint venture, this generally has a positive 
impact on markets: firms usually become more efficient, competition 
intensifies and the final consumer will benefit from higher-quality goods at 
fairer prices.  However, mergers which create or strengthen a dominant 
market position are prohibited in order to prevent ensuing abuses.  A firm is 
in a dominant position when it is able to act on the market without having to 
take account of the reaction of its competitors, suppliers or customers.  In a 
dominant position a firm can, for example, increase its prices above those of 
its competitors without fearing any loss of profit.194
It would be difficult to place the merger review policy goals of the E.U. and the 
U.S. precisely in an abstract one-dimensional policy space such as the one depicted 
in Figure 3.  The similarities between the legal and informal statements of policy 
goals discussed above indicate, however, that the preferences of the E.U. and the 
U.S. would be better represented by points a and b, which are relatively close to 
each other, than points a’ and b’.  In summary, in the words of one E.U. 
competition official, E.U. and U.S. merger review rules “are—in most respects—
pursuing the same objectives.”195  “Put simply, the E.U. and U.S. agree on what 
competition policy should be all about.”196
3. Enforcement Problems 
E.U.-U.S. merger review cooperation involves a low level of enforcement 
problems.  Even if there might be payoff structures associated with the review of 
certain mergers that may create a Prisoners’ Dilemma situation in which defection 
is the dominant strategy, E.U.-U.S. merger review cooperation is not a single-play 
193 “Guide to the Federal Trade Commission.” 
www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/general/guidetoftc.htm. 
194 See “Citizen’s Guide to Competition Policy - Control of major cross-border mergers,” 
available at  http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/citizen/citizen_mergers_en.html.  This is 
not to say that there cannot be problems of preference heterogeneity in specific cases.  See 
discussion of high politics below. 
195 Valentine & De, supra note 187, at 2. 
196 Newman and Echevarria, supra note 187, at 26. 
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game.  To the contrary, there is iteration—year after year, the E.U. and the U.S. are 
presented with opportunities to cooperate on the review of various mergers—and, 
as noted above, enforcement problems generally are less severe when there is 
iteration. 
In addition, the depth of cooperation in E.U.-U.S. merger review cooperation 
appears to be relatively low because none of the arrangements discussed above 
require the parties to make fundamental changes to how they regulate 
competition.197  For example, the TAD, NTA and TEP are nonbinding declarations 
of intent.  The 1991 Agreement states that it shall not be interpreted “in a manner 
inconsistent with the existing laws, or as requiring any change in the laws, of the 
United States of America or the European Communities or of their respective 
States or Member States.”  The 1991 Agreement also allows the parties to take their 
“own national interests into account in determining whether and to what extent to 
provide cooperation in any given matter.”198  Similarly, the Best Practices state that 
they are “intended to set forth an advisory framework for interagency cooperation” 
and “the agencies reserve their full discretion in the implementation of these best 
practices and nothing in this document is intended to create any enforceable 
rights.”199  For these reasons, it does not appear that E.U.-U.S. merger review 
cooperation entails serious enforcement problems. 
4. High Politics 
Using traditional concepts of “high” and “low” politics, E.U.-U.S. antitrust 
cooperation involves low politics since it is in the realm of economic regulation and 
business, not national security or military affairs.  This would seem to be an 
accurate characterization, but only with the qualification that, in specific merger 
cases, issues of high politics may emerge.  For example, both E.U. and U.S. 
antitrust authorities asserted jurisdiction over the proposed Boeing-McDonnell 
Douglas merger, even though neither Boeing nor McDonnell Douglas had any 
production assets in the E.U.  “It provoked nationalistic responses in both the 
United States and Europe, with politicians accusing each other of supporting their 
own national champion. . .  [T]he case demonstrates that when important interests 
are involved (and nationalistic sentiments invoked) interagency cooperation may 
not be sufficient to avoid conflict and surmount differences.”200  U.S. government 
197 Recall the definition of “depth” given above, which is based on Downs et al., supra 
note 110.  The author does not use this term to imply that the cooperation between E.U. and 
U.S. regulators is unimportant or minor; to the contrary, the evidence shows that it is 
important and extensive.  The case of E.U.-U.S. merger review shows that regulatory 
cooperation does not have to require great changes in state behavior or high levels of 
obligation in order to yield substantial benefits to both parties and sustained patterns of 
interaction. 
198 Janow, supra note 154, at 35. 
199 Id. 
200 Janow, supra note 154, at 44-45.  The United States House of Representatives, in its 
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officials were concerned that prohibiting the proposed merger would harm U.S. 
defense interests.201  The U.S. House of Representatives even got involved, voting 
416-2 in favor of a resolution warning the E.U. against “an unwarranted and 
unprecedented interference in a U.S. business transaction.”202  Although this is an 
exceptional case and an arrangement was finally made whereby both the E.U. and 
U.S. ultimately approved the merger,203 it is important to note that even a 
quintessentially “low politics” issue like competition policy can at times take on a 
high politics dimension that can limit the potential of transgovernmental 
cooperation. 
5.  Issue Complexity 
E.U.-U.S. merger review cooperation involves a high level of complexity—both 
legal204  and economic.205  In both Europe and the U.S., competition policy is the 
domain of highly specialized economists and lawyers who represent businesses in 
the private sector and the government in regulatory agencies.  This complexity is 
magnified in the transatlantic context because the E.U. and U.S. each have their 
own competition laws, policies and procedures and use different types of economic 
analysis to evaluate mergers that need to be taken into account when designing 
Resolution No. 191 (1997), available at http://thomas.loc.gov, stated that “the European 
Commission is apparently determined to disapprove the [Boeing/McDonnell Douglas] 
merger to gain an unfair competitive advantage for Airbus Industries, a government-owned 
aircraft manufacturer.” 
201 Devuyst, supra note 154, at 143. 
202 House Resolution 191, adopted July 22, 1997, available at http://thomas.loc.gov; 
“Case Study: The Boeing-McDonnell Merger,” Economic Perspectives, USIA Electronic 
Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1, February 1999, at 
http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/ites/0299/ijee/boeing.htm. 
203 See Thomas L. Boeder, The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger, in ANTITRUST GOES 
GLOBAL: WHAT FUTURE FOR TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION? 139 (Simon J. Evenett et al. 
eds., 2000). 
204 For an overview of the legal complexities of merger review, see, e.g., James S. Venit 
& William J. Kolasky, Substantive Convergence and Procedural Dissonance in Merger 
Review, in Antitrust Goes Global: What Future for Transatlantic Cooperation? 79-97 (Simon 
J. Evenett et al. eds., 2000). 
205 For an overview of the economics of merger review, see, e.g., Edward M. Graham, 
Economic Considerations in Merger Review, in ANTITRUST GOES GLOBAL: WHAT FUTURE 
FOR TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION? 57-78 (Simon J. Evenett et al. eds., 2000)  Links to E.U. 
merger review laws, regulations and procedures may be found at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/citizen/citizen_mergers_en.html.  An overview of 
U.S. antitrust law is available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/foia/divisionmanual/ch2.htm, and 
links to U.S. merger review laws, regulations and procedures may be found at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/hsr/hsr.htm.  For an overview of the complexities of merger review on 
both sides of the Atlantic, see, e.g., Valentine and De, supra note 187, and ICPAC, supra 
note 129. 
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consistent remedies or developing work sharing arrangements.206
In addition to the legal expertise required by regulators to apply complex laws 
and regulations, economic expertise is required to perform tasks including 
definition of the geographic scope of relevant markets; modeling anticipated 
economic effects of business transactions; determining implications for market 
power; assessing efficiency gains and losses, and competitive restraints; and 
formulating remedies that will mitigate adverse economic effects.  Depending on 
the types of businesses proposing to merge, expertise in the economics of different 
business sectors also is required.  This expertise must be applied to reach merger 
decisions within limited timeframes imposed by E.U. and U.S. procedural 
requirements. 
This complexity appears to be increasing.  As noted in recent FTC testimony, 
new technologies and the rise of the knowledge-based economy are causing 
mergers to grow in size, scope and complexity, making it necessary for regulators 
to undertake even more extensive review of proposed mergers.207
6. Agency Autonomy 
The DOJ, FTC and DGC are moderately autonomous.  On the one hand, they are 
under a legal duty to act independently on the basis of applicable law when 
reviewing proposed mergers.208  On the other hand, “[t]his does not mean that 
traditional state structures have simply and completely abdicated all powers in this 
area.”209  In high profile cases high-level state leaders may attempt to put pressure 
on regulators to reach certain outcomes.210  Moreover, “[t]he U.S. Congress 
frequently summons FTC and [DOJ] officials to give testimony in formal hearings 
on antitrust problems.  Similarly, the European commissioner in charge of 
competition policy is regularly grilled in the European Parliament.”211  The 
European Court of Justice can also limit the European Commission’s freedom of 
action, as it did when it ruled that it was for the European Council, not the 
Commission, to conclude the 1991 Agreement with the U.S.212  Thus, while E.U. 
and U.S. regulators are technically independent, their autonomy is not unlimited. 
206 See, e.g., Evenett et al., supra note 155. 
207 Federal Trade Commission, “An Overview of Federal Trade Commission Antitrust 
Activities,” Testimony before Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust, 
Competition, and Business and Consumer Rights, United States Senate, Sept. 19, 2002, 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/09/020919overviewtestimony.htm#N_1_. 
208 Devuyst, supra note 154, at 150-151. 
209 Id. at 150. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. at 130. 
212 Id. at 135. The Council and the Commission jointly ratified the 1991 Agreement in 
1995, declaring it effective as of its original conclusion in 1991. Id. 
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7. Antecedent Interaction in International Organizations 
There has been a moderate level of interaction among European and U.S. 
competition regulators in international organizations that predates the currently 
high levels of bilateral regulatory cooperation.213  For example, European and U.S. 
regulators have been interacting with each other in the context of the Organization 
for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) for some time.  The OECD 
has been a multilateral forum for discussing cooperation on anticompetitive 
practices affecting international trade since as early as 1967, and in 1999 the 
OECD’s Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs issued 
recommended guidelines for transnational merger notifications.214  In addition, 
since 1999 the OECD has issued a variety of best practices addressing various 
aspects of the merger review process.  The E.U. has been eager to establish the 
WTO as a forum for cooperation on antitrust matters and negotiation of core 
principles of competition law to be enforced by the WTO, but the U.S. has resisted 
these efforts.215  As a result, discussion of antitrust policy in the WTO context has 
been significant, but limited.216
D. Evaluating the Conjectures 
In summary, based on the foregoing evidence, Part IV has estimated that the 
level of transgovernmentalism, the dependent variable, is high in the case of E.U.-
U.S. merger review cooperation.  Regarding the explanatory variables, this part has 
estimated that distribution problems are moderate; preference heterogeneity is low; 
enforcement problems are low; the extent of “high politics” is generally low, but 
with notable exceptions; issue complexity is high; agency autonomy is moderate; 
and the level of antecedent interaction in international organizations is moderate.  
These results are presented in Table 1 below, and compared to the values expected 








213 As noted above, such interactions actually constitute, and therefore cannot be 
considered a cause, of Slaughter’s first type of transgovernmentalism (government networks 
within international organizations).  It may be, however, an independent cause of the other 
types of transgovernmentalism. 
214 Parisi, supra note 167, at section II; Devuyst, supra note 154, at 133.  Access to these 
documents is available from the OECD’s website, www.oecd.org. 
215 Devuyst, supra note 154, at 133; Evenett et al., supra note 155, at 18. 
216 See www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/comp_e/comp_e.htm. 
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Table 1 
Evaluating Conjectures about Levels of Transgovernmentalism 
 Conjecture Case Study 
Distribution Problems Low Moderate 
Preference Heterogeneity Low Low 
Enforcement Problems Low Low 
High Politics Low Low/Moderate 
Issue Complexity High High 
Agency Autonomy High Moderate 
Antecedent Interactions High Moderate 
 
As the table illustrates, the results are generally consistent with the conjectures 
about the determinants of the structure of legal and regulatory cooperation.  The 
findings regarding preference heterogeneity, enforcement problems and issue 
complexity are as expected, while the case is less clear-cut regarding distribution 
problems, high politics, agency autonomy, and antecedent interactions in 
international organizations.  The implication of these findings is that this article’s 
rational design theory of transgovernmentalism may be a plausible one.  However, 
additional cases must be examined before reaching more definitive conclusions; in 
the meantime, these results should be considered preliminary. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Legal and regulatory cooperation can be transgovernmental or interstate.  These 
are fundamentally different forms of cooperation.  The former involves cross-
border interactions among different states’ regulatory agencies and the lawyers and 
regulators that staff them, whereas the latter consists of interactions among states 
represented by heads of state and behaving as unitary actors.  These two forms of 
cooperation are not, however, mutually exclusive.  To the contrary, international 
cooperation between states in a given issue area is likely to have both 
transgovernmental and interstate dimensions.  Scholars including Anne-Marie 
Slaughter have documented and explained the rise of transgovernmentalism in 
general.  The goal of this article, however, has been to help explain how and why 
levels of transgovernmentalism vary across different groups of states and different 
issue areas. 
To pursue that goal, this article has proposed a rational design theory of 
transgovernmentalism.  The theory posits that transgovernmental versus interstate 
cooperation is a rational design choice made by heads of state and regulators taking 
into account the costs and benefits of the two forms of cooperation under a given 
set of circumstances.  This article then used the theory to derive a series of 
conjectures regarding what types of circumstances matter for the design choice and 
how.  More precisely, the conjectures were that relative levels of 
transgovernmentalism are likely to be lower when there are more serious 
distribution, preference heterogeneity and enforcement problems because interstate 
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forms of cooperation offer solutions to these problems that transgovernmental 
forms generally are less capable of  providing; lower in issue areas involving high 
politics; and higher when issue complexity, agency autonomy and the extent of 
prior regulatory interactions in international organizations are high.  The case of 
E.U.-U.S. merger review cooperation is generally consistent with these conjectures, 
although more so with the conjectures regarding preference heterogeneity, 
enforcement problems and issue complexity. 
This article, however, represents only the first step in the development of the 
rational design theory of transgovernmentalism. Further progress will require both 
additional theoretical and empirical work.  Theoretically, one of the principal 
questions is the extent to which the role of domestic political actors should be taken 
into account.  This article has consistently treated heads of state and regulators as 
the exclusive designers of international cooperation.  In the delegation context the 
theory has treated heads of state as the sole principals and it has treated regulators 
as the agents.  As noted above, this is a substantial simplification of reality.  Other 
domestic political actors, particularly legislatures and interest groups, may also 
play an important role in influencing the structure of international cooperation.  In 
addition, in terms of delegation, legislatures rather than heads of state may be the 
real principals in some cases of international cooperation.  The challenge is to 
determine whether the reduced theoretical parsimony that would result from 
incorporating these additional domestic political actors would be outweighed by 
deeper insights about the determinants of levels of transgovernmentalism.217
Connecting the realms of theory and empirics is the question of 
operationalization: how can the conceptual variables in the theory and in the 
conjectures derived from the theory be empirically measured?  Concepts like issue 
complexity and enforcement problems are of considerable theoretical importance, 
but to what extent can they be measured in a consistent manner from case to case?  
Developing improved techniques for reliably and consistently operationalizing the 
variables used in this article is an important objective. 
Empirically, to move beyond a preliminary plausibility test of the rational design 
theory of transgovernmentalism, additional case studies will be necessary.  The 
case studies would ideally be selected to ensure a sampling across different issue 
areas and different groups of states, and to ensure variation in the values of the 
explanatory variables without regard to levels of transgovernmentalism.218  
217 In addition, alternative theories of transgovernmentalism should also be explored.  
See, e.g., Kal Raustiala’s theory in his 2002 article on transgovernmental networks and 
international law.  Raustiala, supra note 9. 
218 KING, KEOHANE & VERBA, supra note 138, at 140 (“the best ‘intentional’ [research] 
design selects observations to ensure variation in the explanatory variable . . . without regard 
to the values of the dependent variables.  Only during the research do we discover the values 
of the dependent variable and then make our initial causal inference by examining the 
differences in the distribution of outcomes on the dependent variable for given values of the 
explanatory variables”). 
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Interesting case studies might range from cooperation on the regulation of 
corporate securities, environmental regulation and trade regulation to peace keeping 
and collective security. 
It is important to seek a better understanding of international legal and regulatory 
cooperation.  Such understanding can enhance the ability to design effective 
frameworks for cooperation.  It can improve the ability to manage and, when 
deemed appropriate, to facilitate the activities of transgovernmental networks.  
Moreover, because transgovernmentalism has serious implications not only for 
cooperation across borders but also for governance within borders, the structure of 
legal and regulatory cooperation has both international and domestic importance.  
In this new world order, this research agenda is well worth pursuing. 
 
